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Erin Manning
Introduction
Intercessors are essential. Creation is all about 
intercessors. Without them, there is no work.
Gilles Deleuze (1995: 125, translation modified)
When the Immediations book series at Open Humanities Press 
was launched, it was done with Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the 
intercessor1 in mind. We were looking for a way to give voice to 
a kind of collaboration that would work from within the weave 
of research and writing, a collaboration that would give texture 
to a voice (or a multiplicity of voice) toward a conversation to 
come. A conversation to come is one that invents interlocutors, 
one that refuses to know in advance where the encounter will 
lead. Deleuze calls this a minoritarian discourse: “We must catch 
someone fabulating, catch them ‘in the act’ of fabulating. Then a 
minoritarian discourse, with two or many speakers, takes shape… 
To catch fabulation in the act is to seize the movement of the 
constitution of a people. A people never preexists (translation 
modified)” (Deleuze 1995: 125–6).
Nocturnal Fabulations: Ecology, Vitality and Opacity in the Cinema 
of Apichatpong Weerasethakul, an eight-handed, four-bodied book 
by Érik Bordeleau, Ronald Rose-Antoinette, Toni Pape and Adam 
Szymanski, is an essay in intercessing. This is not a book that is 
simply “about” the work of the cinematographer Apichatpong 
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Weerasethakul, though it does engage his work in detail. It is a 
book that deeply questions what else might be at stake in setting 
up the conditions for collaboration across two genres – cinema 
and writing. It is a book that asks what else this uneasy interstice 
of image-thought can look like when it moves onto the page. 
This thinking-with can be understood as an engagement with 
how the films of Apichatpong themselves propose collective 
ecologies of thought and how these ecologies foreground new 
ways of seeing the image as a movement of thought. This gesture 
of thinking with and across image and text, of being moved by 
a work that intercesses two discrete but intertwined perceptual 
processes, developing vocabulary not to “explain” the work but 
to reactivate it by other means, proposes a wholly different ethos 
of engagement. Refusing to position itself outside Apichatpong’s 
work in an effort to situate it once and for all within a genre, 
or within a historical period, or order it using a theoretical 
method, what Nocturnal Fabulations proposes instead is a direct 
engagement with the forces of thought that move through 
the work and make it work. It is an attempt, in writing, to see 
where else these forces can lead. Apichatpong Weerasethakul is 
a perfect match for such a project: there is always a sense, in 
watching his films, that he is a participant in a process that has 
yet to quite unfold, and that his work is, before all else, dedicated 
to a people (and a conversation) yet to come. 
Apichatpong describes his work as “open cinema”, and often 
seems at odds with questions interviewers pose, uneasy with 
their probing into plot sequence and intentionality: “Sometimes 
you don’t need to understand everything to appreciate a certain 
beauty,” he tells one interviewer. “And I think the film operates 
in the same way. It’s like tapping into someone’s mind. The 
thinking pattern is quite random, jumping here and there like a 
monkey” (Rose 2010). In another interview: “I believe that cinema 
has its own life,” and then, when the interviewer prods a bit 
more: “Yeah, but the more I explain, the more the movie loses 
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its mystery so I think I should stop! […] [I]t’s the mood and the 
feeling that matters to me” (Peranson 2010).
With some filmmakers, one might have the sense of these being 
anti-intellectual attempts to avoid taking a stance – “you just 
have to feel it – as I can’t explain it” a stand-in for “the artist has 
an intuition that comes from outside the everyday and defies 
explanation.” This is not what is at stake with Apichatpong, for 
his films do always take a stance, and he does not shy away 
from complex conceptual-aesthetic issues. But he does trouble 
language, especially the kind of language that would like to frame 
experience, his effort more directed toward the complexity of 
what feeling can do at the edges of ineffability. Here feeling is not 
so much outside of language as with its uneasy telling, the plot 
not carried by the tenor of an emotion that orients the image as 
by the affective tonality of a thinking-feeling that resists stable 
time signatures. Language is made uneasy precisely because 
it does not easily speak in the cacophony of time unmoored. 
What is felt in Apichatpong’s work, what matters in the feeling, 
is carried forth by an image that cannot quite be left behind in 
the explaining. To explain the work, to categorize it sequentially, 
as interviewers (and critics) are wont to do, is to misunderstand 
how its movements undermine any kind of linear telling. It is to 
underestimate what the image can do.
There is great richness in what is carried forth in Apichatpong’s 
work, and it is this that the texts that follow embrace. In 
this sense, theirs can also be imagined as a kind of futurist 
archeological work, a speculative gesture not of this time that 
touches the limits of what else the image can do, asking, with 
Apichatpong, what it might mean to think like a monkey jumps.
To be an intercessor is to attend to the qualities of the thresholds 
of an encounter between forces and forms of thought, and to 
inquire, each time anew, how the threshold carries incipient 
form from image to experience, from experience to image. 
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For how we perceive really matters in Apichatpong’s works: 
“everything matters, […] you’re not really looking forward to the 
finished work but looking forward to every moment; enjoying 
every moment” (Elphick 2015). What is unusual, however, is 
that this mattering isn’t primarily inward-looking: the image’s 
thinking-feeling does not begin and end here, in this cinematic 
experiment, in this plot sequence.
Before I used to think of film as maybe just one 
project. With my process being finishing it piece 
by piece, before moving on to different themes 
or interests. But lately I think of film like satellites: 
surrounding this ongoing universe; even building that 
universe. So when I finished Cemetery of Splendour, 
it wasn’t really finished. It’s almost like a platform, 
to move onto another work that can be built from 
it. But it all ends up being one piece; all together”. 
(Elphick 2015)
Open cinema as punctually expressed singularity across a series 
that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. Open cinema as 
relational platform across times in the cinematic making. 
To be an intercessor is to participate in this relational platform, 
not to mediate it. It is to recognize how the immediacy of an 
encounter with an image, with a movement of thought, or 
better yet, with the intervals of thought-images yet to come, 
affects what it means to perceive. Intercessors change the 
norms of contact. Changing the norms of contact is always a 
creative gesture: there is no intercessor that would exist once 
and for all, nor is there a creative act that can flourish without 
intercession. “Fictive or real, animated or inanimate, one must 
make one’s intercessors. It is a series. If you don’t form a series, 
even completely imaginary, you are lost. I need my intercessors 
to express myself, and they would never be able to express 
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themselves without me: we are always many at work, even when 
you don’t see it” (Deleuze 1995: 125, translation modified).
To act is to have been intercessed, to have been moved by 
conditions beyond the frame of an encounter predetermined. 
A creative act, it must be underscored, is not something that 
belongs to me: the work is activated in a field of relation that is 
always lively with intercessions. And so to seek to know a work is 
to be curious about how it has been intercessed. 
Intercession occurs at all levels: the artist is intercessor, the 
writer is intercessor, the ecologies that orient their coming 
together are intercessing. In the case of Apichatpong, the 
intercessions are wildly layered: histories that refuse to remain 
unspoken, tales retold in settings too strange to serve as 
placeholders for simple ideological positioning, characters 
(re)emerging from future-pasts, haunting the image that itself 
refuses to stand still. It is the complexity of intercession that 
keeps the image moving: the creative impulse is no longer 
restrained to that which flies off the screen today into the movie 
theatre or tomorrow into the textual analysis. Intercessions move 
through Apichatpong’s films, activating cinema’s potential for 
coming-between in times as yet uncharted.
Toni Pape, Ronald Rose-Antoinette, Adam Szymanski and Érik 
Bordeleau tend to this perception-in-act. “The feeling of a story 
exceeds the hard facts of its plot and outlasts its delivery,” writes 
Toni Pape in this collection (20). What else can the image do, he 
wonders, in the intervals of its own becoming, a time he calls 
“no-longer-not-yet: no longer street vendor, not yet storyteller; 
no longer documentary, not yet fiction”? (Pape, this collection: 
23) What fabulations, Pape asks, can operate in the seriality of 
an image-time that defies chronology while not resisting strong 
moments of representation, a time of consistency more than 
of coherence? What else can populate the living screen when 
“cinema creates an opening in life and gives us a chance to 
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fabulate a detour, to meander along life’s indirect ways?” (Pape, 
this collection: 30)
These open questions are everywhere present in this book that 
engages in a very close reading of Apichatpong’s work without 
ever forgetting that the action of pinning-it-down threatens to 
weaken the intercessory collaboration. For to know is not to 
intercess but to settle into position. How might writing alter 
what else is happening here, each author seems to wonder, 
how might writing follow the detours invited by the images? 
How might writing further the thinking-feeling that opens the 
image – the cinema – to its outside at every turn? How might it 
create intercrossings that themselves become invitations for 
intercessors to come? How else might the conversation take place 
between mediums so potentially incompatible as the temporality 
of the image undone and undoing, and the words relacing 
and knotting?
But, their writing also suggests: wouldn’t it be unwise to 
underestimate the power of words, and to miss the force of what 
a gesture of intercession that moves between language and 
image can compose? In this book which presents itself in both 
English and French – a book written across two languages and 
discussed always in the crossing of these languages, read and 
re-read by its authors with the kind of attention that retains the 
singularity of each contribution even as it suggests a practice 
of collective writing – the potentials are many, including the 
potential of language to activate the force of what an image can 
do when it gives itself over to the text.
A collective writing doesn’t have to be four-bodied at each turn. 
Like the becoming-image, like the movement of thought, it can 
be an across-ness, a punctual gesturing toward a collective 
project that refuses to succumb to a oneness of perspective. This 
gesture is similar to what Adam Szymanski sees in Apichatpong’s 
films when he discusses their ecological reach – ecological not 
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only in the sense of their reverence for nature, but equally in 
their concern for how an ecology is co-inhabited by a range 
of different beings usually separated by the divisions built up 
between humans and non-humans and between the living and 
the dead. An engagement with an ecological approach to image-
thought, or what Szymanski calls an “ecosophic aesthetic” is 
one that recognizes the taut and elastic connections between 
tendencies in an evolving environment. An ecosophic aesthetic 
hones techniques for perceiving more closely the forces that 
compose and dissolve a community, those forces that make 
felt the undercurrents of existence as we know it. These forces 
are everywhere present in Apichatpong’s work – they are what 
detours the story, what prevents the plot from giving itself too 
easily to the curious interviewer. 
These forces, I want to suggest, are also active in the listening-
across of these four texts. As are the detourings. The collectivity 
of the writing is more ecological, more ecosophically aesthetic, 
than it is univocal. Resonances are there, but they are there more 
in force than in form: these four texts do not cite one another, 
or even necessarily engage with the same films. Sometimes 
their views have a quality of divergence that differentiates them 
at a level that language can’t quite pinpoint. Something more 
complex than agreement is at stake – a curiosity, perhaps, with 
what travels with the words, with the unsaid and its power 
of articulation. For, like Apichatpong’s images, the words that 
intercess must also carry a certain uneasiness with recognition. 
They must also trouble the tendency to be held in place.
But how to begin when forces are everywhere active in an 
aesthetic ecosophy? This is Ronald Rose-Antoinette’s question 
and the refrain that moves his text. The answer is simple: in the 
middle. This is not a simple task, however, constrained as we are 
by language’s tendency to place thought subjectly-verbly-objectly 
in a row. Language must break, must almost reach its absolute 
resistance, and here, perhaps, the image’s potential will be felt. 
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The image’s potential, Rose-Antoinette suggests, recasts what 
memory can be. In Apichatpong’s work, a memory is crafted that 
troubles an account of recognition. This is not a memory for that 
which is known, for a past contained. It is a memory of a futurity, 
a memory of a trace. A future “unforgettable” (Rose-Antoinette, 
this collection: 125). 
An image of the future. With monkeys lurking, unsettling both 
thought and image, bringing language to its limit. But that’s the 
point: that the image refuses to stand still, even when at its most 
still, as when the camera encounters the monkey-ghost looking 
straight at us with his red eyes.
We are haunted by the red eyes, haunted by the magic lantern 
that keeps us in the atemporality of an image that refuses to 
settle. We are “called” as Rose-Antoinette writes in this collection, 
Fig. 1: The close-up of the monkey-ghost looking straight at us with his 
red eyes, from Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives.
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“to err into a future” that is more orientation than goal. No film of 
Apichatpong ever leaves us with a sense of knowing what comes 
next (or even what has come to pass). Time errs and takes us into 
that erring.
An allure is present, a style. This is Érik Bordeleau’s contribution. 
“For the word ‘allure’ points toward the singular manner 
that courses through a being and characterizes it, a sort of 
evanescent signature – a style – charged with a force of affective 
propulsion that invites further folds and relays” (Bordeleau, 
this collection: 80). The image seduces us, but it also causes 
a certain disquiet. It moves slowly, the takes often long, the 
visuals strangely more-than real. Of this place and yet beyond. 
An uneasiness lurks even while we feel ourselves pulled in, 
caught up, a lure for feeling taking over that disorients, that calls 
attention toward itself in a way that exceeds expectation. We 
watch in ways unaccustomed. We are made uneasy by the way 
the image errs, and we are moved in this erring. 
When Deleuze says we must invent our own intercessors, 
what he also means is that we are never wholly ourselves. 
Apichatpong provides a window into this unseemliness and 
invites us to linger here, to be engaged in what matters via the 
image, via its magic lanterning – the history of Thailand, its 
repression, the role of death in experience, the place of sickness, 
and of dreams, the relation of animal and human worlds, the 
environmental crisis – without providing a sense of where to go 
or who to be. For that is not the work of the image. It is not the 
image’s work to narrate where the process can go. The film is 
a platform, and as a platform, it will only ever be as good as its 
intercessors. What the image can do matters, but its mattering 
moves far beyond where the image-as-content can go. The 
image-mattering must call intercessors into the act.
This is also true of writing. The writing with an artwork can only 
ever do its work if it proposes operations that exceed its bounds. 
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The condition of a people to come, as Deleuze might say, is that 
the work always remains to be done.
The cinema of Apichatpong Weerasethakul needs to be acted. 
It needs to be dreamed. “Thus cinema can be a phantom in this 
sense: because it’s something that you really need to dream. 
Cinema is a vehicle we produce for ourselves and as part of 
us. It’s like an extension of our soul that manifests itself” (Kim 
cited in Bordeleau, this collection: 90). It needs to be dreamed 
not to unravel its content, but to create more capacity to 
dream, to explore what Bordeleau calls the “unprecedented 
degrees of defocalisation that Apichatpong manages to operate 
directly on the subtle element [that is cinema]” (Bordeleau, this 
collection: 90). 
Apichatpong’s films make us visionaries. This is perhaps their 
first act of intercession. In doing so, they force us to ask not 
what we’ve seen, but what we have not yet been able to see. And 
they invite us to see it with the eyes of an other, more-than real, 
more-than human.
Notes
1. It is important to note that the English translation speaks of “media-
tors” when Deleuze writes of “intercessors”. Intercessors are the op-
posite of mediators: they don’t move between already-identifiable 
terms. They create the terms of their eventual intercession. They are 
immediators.
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What is a “mode of life”? A first, rather technical attempt at an 
answer might come to the term mode from the perspective of 
grammar. We would then think of a mode (often also “mood”) as 
a grammatical marker that expresses one’s attitude towards a 
statement. Do we express a fact, an order, a possibility, a desire? 
Accordingly, we would speak (at least in the few Indo-European 
languages that we know) in the indicative, imperative, conditional 
or subjunctive moods. And, indeed, one can live by “facts” and 
order-words. Or one can live by potentials and desires.
Such a technical approach lends itself to diffuse a bit the 
grandeur that one might attribute to the expression “modes of 
life”. For starters, nobody lives in only one mode just like nobody 
speaks in just one grammatical mode. The potentiality of the 
“maybe” in its pure form would be as unlivable as the oppressive 
determination of a continuous imperative. A life is composed 
through the interplay of various modes. (In other words, a mode 
of life is not a “way of life”.) So with respect to the cinema of 
Apichatpong this means that there is no single, definitive mode 
of life we could ascribe to him as the “auteur”. Rather, his films 
create moods or tonalities that infuse our lived reality and can 
inflect our lines of life. 
The second point then is that modes of life are minor forces that 
can act temporarily. If we expect a film to “completely change 
our life” we are bound to be disappointed. But if we can think of 
change on a microscopic scale, then we can begin to register the 
minor inflections produced by the mood of a film. The force of 
Mysterious Object at Noon consists precisely in infusing people’s 
everyday life with the unassuming “what if” of fabulation, making 
way for so many other “maybes”. A similar thing happens in 
The Adventures of Iron Pussy when we co-perform new (minor) 
genders with the image. That, to us, is a mode/mood of life. 
And thought in this sense, Apichatpong’s cinema opens up the 
possibility for new modes of life.
One more word about what is “new” about them because that 
is of course another grand word. Many of Apichatpong’s films 
deal in one way or another with the history of Thailand. Now, 
in what mode does cinema usually stage the encounter with 
history? Mainly in the factual mode of the indicative. Think of 
Hollywood’s historical dramas and their obsession with realism 
as well as a very conservative notion of mimetic “method” acting. 
Or think of the many documentaries which, even if they re-write 
history, tell us “how it really was”. (Of course, there are numerous 
interesting exceptions.) It is in this context that Apichatpong’s 
cinema really makes a difference, proposing an encounter with 
history in the conditional and subjunctive modes, asking not 
only what could have happened but also how the past could still 
be acting today, asking what the past desires. One interesting 
thing that happens when you infuse history with the “maybe” of 
the conditional is that time stops being linear. This is what the 
chapter on Mysterious Object at Noon and Iron Pussy suggests 
when it talks about concurring re-tellings of the past. Somebody 
who says “Oh, let me tell the story. You’ve got it all wrong!” is 
effectively recreating a mood that is bound to shape the present 
moment. The past, as it is now experienced in retrospect, really 
was different. In a similar way, Apichatpong’s films productively 
falsify one another across time, ultimately making chronology 
a rather useless concept. There is no chronological beginning 
or end to Apichatpong’s oeuvre. There is beginning only in the 
sense that we give to it (following Nietzsche and Guattari) of 
cosmic emergence or eternal return. A beginning that is always in 
the present.
Toni Pape
The Vitality of Fabulation: Improvisation 
and Clichés in Mysterious Object at Noon and 
The Adventure of Iron Pussy
The Feeling of a Story
Let’s begin with a cliché: everybody enjoys a good story. 
From here, one may go on and ask what constitutes a story. Or 
one could continue and dispute the contentious criteria that 
make for a good story. Either way, one has already moved to 
the end of the sentence. What if one lingers in the proposition, 
general though it may be? We may, in that case, discover a 
concern with joy. We may even encounter a collectivity cloaked 
as “everybody”. Storytelling, even for the solitary writer, is an 
affair of the many, an experience of the multiple. The telling of 
a story, of any story from family lore to shared mythologies, is 
a force that, among many other effects, can bind or dissolve a 
community. You can notice it in the sharing of stories in a family 
or between friends: “How did you two meet?” or “Remember 
that prank we played on our history teacher? What was her name 
again?” And so the ball gets rolling. What unravels from such balls 
of yarn is not just a sequence of events as related but a feeling of 
past life that colors the present. The feeling of a story exceeds 
the hard facts of its plot and outlasts its delivery. Think of a novel 
or a film that affected you as a teenager. Do you remember 
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the story? Somewhat, but hardly. What remains is a feeling, an 
affective tone which, strictly speaking, you don’t even need to 
remember because it returns effortlessly and wholly, all by itself. 
The telling of a story, remembered or invented or a bit of both, 
opens towards a collective dreaming, in which life-as-is softens 
and becomes sensitive to its own potential: life in the mode of 
what if. This mode of the what-if suspends the evidentness of 
the everyday, the routines of the as-is, and flushes the moment 
with the joy of speculation. “What would you do if you won the 
lottery?” The thrill of this most inconsequential question arises 
from the opening it creates: for a moment, nothing is obvious, 
everything could be different. It’s not much different for the 
past. “Oh, let me tell the story. You’ve got it all wrong!” The past 
could have been different; it depends on the telling. Storytelling 
makes for joyful speculation because it becomes momentarily 
possible to reinvent life. This collective feeling spills over the 
narrative proper and resonates forth into life-living.1 The cliché’s 
“everybody” is really an anybody in the making.
Fabulation and Joy
Mysterious Object at Noon is a story invented over the duration 
of three years by various people all across Thailand. The film 
is shot in black-and-white on 16 mm film, which contributes 
to a pronounced lo-fi, documentary aesthetic. Inspired by 
the surrealist procedure called cadavre exquis, Apichatpong 
Weerasethakul – who is credited here as a mere “story editor” 
– meanders from the northern provinces of Thailand to the 
south and, in a series of chance encounters, asks street vendors, 
farmers, local theater groups, and children to collectively tell 
a story. Each storyteller has to continue the tale where it had 
been left off. Together, they slowly turn a fairly straightforward 
exposition into an intricate tale of humans, animals, and aliens.
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The first shot of the film is from inside a vehicle, a vending truck 
selling seafood, that makes its way through busy city streets. 
For minutes, we roam through the urban landscape; a radio 
soap opera offers a wistful tune on the radio soon accompanied 
by the voice of a narrator relating a story of love and loss. The 
vendors have a purpose but no particular destination, roving 
the neighborhoods to sell their goods at this street corner 
or another. Open drift and dreamy song set the tone for the 
next hour and a half or so. We’ll never lose this momentum as 
the camera moves from one storyteller to the next, even as it 
stands still to record bits of story. As the truck comes to one of 
its many halts, we meet one of the vendors who becomes the 
first narrator in the film. She relates her own story: sold by her 
parents for two bus tickets back to their village home, she now 
ekes out an existence on the streets of Bangkok. She has barely 
finished her story when the “editor” behind the camera asks: 
“Now, do you have any other stories to tell us? It can be real or 
fiction. […] Any story … from a book or something.” Tell us any 
story besides yours. Or rather: now that we have heard your 
story, tell us something else, something more that isn’t you. 
You + n. This is how Mysterious Object at Noon passes through 
Fig. 2: Still from Mysterious Object at Noon, 16 mm (blown up to 35 mm).
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the personal into the impersonal, in a continuation of a familiar 
gesture into the unknown. Continue the telling and extend it into 
the untold. The vendor hesitates longer than the camera. Before 
she begins to fabulate, the image already holds the scene: a boy 
in a wheelchair doing his schoolwork at a desk; a woman stands 
by the window, her back towards the camera (Fig. 2). 
The sound is still that of the busy street corner: “Big tuna fish is 
coming… tuna fish.” What are these images that flash onto the 
screen unannounced, right out of the bustling street? We could 
say that, structurally, the image simply precedes the speech-act 
that will produce it by a few seconds – a stylistic choice. But the 
specific relation between sound and image brings something 
else into sensation, which I would call the incipiency of fabulation 
that is also a feeling of potential. For the image of the boy and his 
teacher does not yet signify the vendor’s story; rather, it signals 
the force of a story forming itself, preparing to cast itself into 
words. The divide between image and sound gives us a sensation 
of the fullness of an interval in which everything is allowed 
to differ from itself, creatively. It is in those few seconds of 
suspension that the vendor exceeds her role as a “social actor” in 
a becoming-storyteller, but not without the director’s becoming-
illustrator and the documentary’s becoming-fabulation. In other 
words, this sequence signals the multiplicity of becoming that 
Mysterious Object at Noon activates. The image can precede 
its own verbal invention because chronologies of before-and-
after do not operate in this interval of becoming. The time of 
becoming is a no-longer-not-yet: no longer street vendor, not yet 
storyteller; no longer documentary, not yet fiction.
Eventually, the story comes into language, in voice-over:
Let’s say there was a house. There was a disabled 
boy and a teacher who came to teach him everyday. 
He didn’t have a chance to see the outside world. 
So she brought lots of photographs for him to see. 
24 Toni Pape
The boy was happy with a chance to be able to study 
like others. His parents hired his teacher but they 
were never home. But I am happy to see him with a 
good teacher. 
Then the street vendor falls silent. The subsequent interactions 
between the boy and the teacher are rendered in images and 
intertitles. “What did you do in the outside world today?” he asks 
her. We see her negotiating for prices on a market. Intertitle: 
“‘Then I had my hair done,’ the teacher says.” Through the 
intertitles, the film takes on a new aesthetic consistency, which 
is not so much that of the silent film era but of the impersonal 
written word. Again only for a brief moment, language does not 
belong to anyone. Of course, we can assume that it is still the 
street vendor who tells the story. Clearly, it is the teacher who 
says, “I had my hair done.” But in both cases, on both levels of 
narration, the telling of the tale has detached itself from the 
human body and can appear as a pure enunciative act, as pure 
experience. This intensity is difficult to sustain. And indeed, 
Mysterious Object at Noon will soon move back towards the 
personal, at the latest when we encounter the next storyteller-
farmer-performer. But impersonality as such is not the goal. 
Mysterious Object at Noon weaves together storytelling as a 
personal creation and as a pure, impersonal experience in order 
to unleash the potential of storytelling as a collective invention 
towards a re-invention of the collective in the process. 
This is fabulation. It is a matter of:
providing [oneself] with ‘intercessors,’ that is, of taking 
real and not fictional characters, but putting these 
very characters in the condition of ‘making up fiction,’ 
of ‘legending,’ of ‘fabulating.’ The author takes a step 
towards his characters, but the characters take a step 
towards the author: double becoming. Fabulation is 
not an impersonal myth, but neither is it a personal 
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fiction: it is a word in act, a speech-act through which 
the character continually crosses the boundary which 
would separate his private business from politics, and 
which itself produces collective utterances. (Deleuze 
1989: 222, translation modified)
Neither personal, nor impersonal. Collective. One does not differ 
from oneself without an intercessor – a human being, a camera, 
a story – that pries open the habitual frame of the subject and 
lures one into self-differentiation. By way of these encounters 
creative of a world, fabulation can count as a mode of living. 
It opens life to the unknown and tentatively composes a new 
temporary and liveable constellation. In this sense, fabulation is a 
catalyst for self-differentiation.
How, then, can we qualify life in the fabulatory mode? It is 
certainly improvised rather than scripted. The fabulators in 
Mysterious Object at Noon pick up the strands of a story where 
they have been left off by someone else. It is impossible for them 
to know what form their tale is going to eventually take. The 
next storyteller in line might take it and, more or less carefully, 
turn it into something completely different. If Apichatpong’s film 
resonates with the Surrealists’ exquisite corpses, it is through 
this indetermination of form. Consider the cadavre exquis, Nude, 
collectively drawn by Yves Tanguy, Joan Miró, Max Morise, and 
Man Ray in 1926 and 1927 (Fig. 3). 
The experiment produces a body that is as yet unorganized – a 
leafy snail-human – that does not yet know how its various parts 
will function together. And yet it is there, on the page, as a lure 
for the imagination. This appeal to fabulate can be felt all the 
more strongly if we consider the process rather than the product. 
Indeed, the most important aspect of the cadavre exquis is not its 
fabulous outcome but the collective experimentation it requires. 
You cannot see Tanguy, Miró, Morise, and Man Ray draw this 
impossible body, but imagine them. Or remember an occasion 
26 Toni Pape
on which you’ve played this game with friends. You pick up the 
end of a few lines with a minimum of information – the distance 
between the lines and their direction – and have to continue 
the drawing. The task involves hesitation and doubt about the 
figurative content of those lines. All you can do is advance in 
a speculative mode, that is, continue without knowing what 
will have taken form. But there is also joy in continuing with a 
difference, in knowing that you will connect and cut at the same 
time. Here, as in any improvisation, the first rule is to always say 
“yes and…”. Improvisation harnesses the indetermination of form 
in an affirmative way, trusting that the leap of faith will land the 
Fig. 3: Nude. Cadavre Exquis with Yves Tanguy, Joan Miró, Max Morise, 
and Man Ray (1926–1927).
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experiment in a safety net of collective care only to rebound into 
another moment of suspension.
Mysterious Object at Noon is a series of such affirmative acts, 
each of which brings out the joyful suspense of the relay. Here 
is the first such instance in the film. After Apichatpong, the 
“story editor”, has illustrated the beginning of the tale, the street 
vendor’s voice returns: 
While they were studying, the teacher, her name is 
Dogfahr, left for a restroom. […] Then he [the boy] 
became suspicious. Why there was no word from the 
teacher. He entered the room and saw the teacher 
lying on the floor. […] He tried to open the door. He 
desperately wanted to help her. He dragged her into 
the room, to the bed. He… He saw… He saw an object 
rolling out from her skirt… That was very strange.
And cut. We’re back in the car. The story – suspended at the 
cliffhanger moment of the mysterious object rolling out of a skirt 
– ambulates into the countryside, stopping at a small cottage 
and a farmer. 
Grandpa, what do you say? They just came in with 
this… That object must be round-shaped. Can it… Can it 
turn into a kid? I don’t think it can.
Yes. Anything you want.
That object was like… It looked like a star. It fell down 
from the sky and turned into a human. It resided in 
a boy’s body. After around a week or two, that boy 
woke up. He said “I’m OK, I’m OK. I was just by myself. 
I can foresee everything. I know my brother and 
sister but now I’m just a kid. I cannot stay with my 
mother, my father, or anyone. So I was residing in this 
floating object.
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Hesitation – “can it?” – is followed by a pronounced act of 
fabulation. The farmer tentatively probes the margin of 
maneuver and, once certain that the story is open wide, she 
makes the cut and pulls out the next, quite magical segment of 
the story. Within the next twenty minutes of the film, the story 
will have traveled to a group of teenagers who, yes, transform 
the boy into a doppelgänger of the teacher. The teacher and her 
double then, yes, vie for a place in the boy’s life – a story that 
is acted out by a theater group. And, yes, then the boy turns 
into a giant… and the ball of yarn rolls on. Two things stand out 
in this movement of suspensions and cuts. First, Mysterious 
Object at Noon brings out the fullness of the interval between 
the storytellers. As we move from one intercessor to the next, 
the film makes sure to provide enough time for us to consider 
the story-thus-far, to appreciate how it has come into itself. This 
appreciation is also a momentary holding of its potential. In 
those moments of suspension, we feel the present moment and 
everything that could come out of it. We feel this all the more 
vividly because we also know that somebody, anybody really, 
is going to come along and make the cut. It is this certainty of 
the next cut that makes the interval vibrate with potential. But 
what comes out, secondly, is that there is no continuation of 
the story without the cut. There is no invention, no novelty, no 
time without the actualization of virtuality. Perhaps one of the 
storytellers in Mysterious Object at Noon is aware of this duplicity 
when he begins by saying: “My story is not really connected.” 
Not really. But all the more because continuation depends on 
disjunction. The cut is the connection. 
There is, as I said at the beginning, something joyful in this 
process. Each new storyteller makes us tremble with giddy 
anxiety at the prospect of her ruthless intervention in the tale 
of Dogfahr and the boy. This thrilling commotion builds over 
the length of the film and reaches its climax towards the end 
when the story is handed over to a group of schoolchildren. 
What a risk to take! It’s like giving your best china to a bunch of 
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kids to play teatime with. You know you’re on the losing end. 
But, oh, the excitement! Within a few moments, Dogfahr has 
been eaten by a tiger and the boy has been stabbed by the 
star child. “That’s the end.” But then: “He has an idea,” says 
one boy pointing at another. And they start over. After all, 
it’s just a story; we can go back and rewrite it. Renewed time 
and again, invention can approach chance and practise the 
necessary cut. Creation by accident. Perhaps it is just a lucky 
accident that Mysterious Object at Noon ends with a group of 
children. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra sings “Let chance come to me, 
it is innocent as a little child” (Nietzsche 1978: 175, translation 
modified). Child’s play is haphazard and effective at the same 
time, like a throw of dice: the throw both opens up to an array of 
possibilities and necessarily reduces them to a single outcome. 
“The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, 
the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation 
of necessity” (Deleuze 1986a: 26). We have already encountered 
the inseparable duo of chance and necessity in the guises of the 
holding-of-potential and the cut. What the children’s unabashed 
fabulation brings out is the double affirmation of both chance 
and necessity. “What? The teacher’s dead?” Apichatpong, behind 
the camera, asks in surprise. The response is a resolute “Yes and” 
which does the boy in as well. But, as we have seen, the end is 
another beginning. What returns in each affirmation is the joy of 
inventing in collusion with chance. When improvising, you have 
to appreciate without being precious: hold the potential, make 
the cut. Enjoy.
The Stroll and Clichés
If this aimless joy is what holds Mysterious Object at Noon 
together despite its various settings, storytellers, and the long 
timeframe of the shoot, it gives the film the rigorous vagueness 
of a stroll, which is so rarely encountered in cinema as in life. 
Think of it, a good stroll is hard to come by. You really need to 
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want to move without any particular destination in mind, content 
not to know which way you turn at the next corner. The movie 
theater should be an ideal space for this. After all, we commit a 
considerable stretch of time to something that has little-to-no 
direct relation to the pragmatic concerns of our life. For ninety 
minutes or so, cinema creates an opening in life and gives us 
a chance to fabulate a detour, to meander along life’s indirect 
ways. And yet we often prefer a more “coherent” film that goes 
straight to the end, that tells us a well-made story. But even 
under these conditions, there “is always a moment when the 
cinema meets the unforeseeable or the improvisation, the 
irreducibility of a present living under the present of narration, 
and the camera cannot even begin its work without engendering 
its own improvisations, both as obstacles and as indispensable 
means” (Deleuze 1986b: 206). Apichatpong’s cinema gives us just 
such moments, which are both a challenge and a condition for 
his style. In Mysterious Object at Noon, the indispensable obstacle 
is the story of Dogfahr and the boy, which loosely connects 
the different acts of fabulation and creates openings for each 
narrator to improvise with the camera but also lays down a 
challenge for the story editor. How will he illustrate the doubling 
of Dogfahr? How will he show us the alien boy’s transformation 
into a giant? And Apichatpong’s illustration is as heterogeneous 
as the story itself: it is spoken, written, sung, signed, and acted 
out (each character by several different actors). Coherence is 
less important here than consistency, the holding together of 
heterogeneous elements within an assemblage. This question 
of consistency is crucial for thinking with Apichatpong because 
his films are often incoherent. Much has been said about how 
his films – most of them segmented into two or three parts 
– actually hold together. It is often done through a doubling 
that is felt as an affective intensification (certainly the case in 
Tropical Malady, see Chapter 4). In Mysterious Object at Noon, 
the procedure of the exquisite corpse functions as an enabling 
constraint (“indispensable obstacle”) because it constitutes a 
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shared concern, a concern that holds the film together across 
its scattered spatial and temporal coordinates. Furthermore, it 
must be said, the narrator’s inventions, haphazard and surprising 
though they may be, are hardly unheard of. The doublings, 
transformation, and “devourings” are in fact fairy tale clichés. 
They are the refrains of popular storytelling and reach into an 
impersonal past that binds a community even as the cliché 
disrupts all narrative progression. This is what Gilles Deleuze calls 
film as “the stroll, the voyage and the continual return journey”: 
It happens in any-space-whatever […] in opposition 
to action which most often unfolded in the 
qualified space-time of the old realism. […] Now, 
what consolidates all this, are the current clichés 
of an epoch or a moment, sound and visual 
slogans. (1986: 208)
In light of this, one can say that Apichatpong has in fact 
developed a set of audiovisual slogans by which one can stroll 
through the entire body of his work. He produces “floating 
images” that “maintain a set [ensemble] in a world without 
totality” or coherence (Deleuze 1986b: 208). Besides the 
segmentation of most of his films into several parts (mostly 
two), think of the many long takes shot from inside a car going 
down a country road or driving through a city landscape. This 
cliché allows you to stroll from Mysterious Object at Noon to 
Uncle Boonmee via Blissfully Yours and, with slight variations, 
Tropical Malady.
Or consider all the scenes in a doctor’s office, which link 
Mysterious Object to Syndromes and a Century and again Blissfully 
Yours (Fig. 4 and 5). The work of this cliché across Apichatpong’s 
films is to articulate encounters: of an individual and an institution 
(Orn’s struggle to obtain medication for the illegal immigrant 
Min); of modern and traditional medicine (the Monk’s herbal 
potion in Syndromes); between physical and spiritual cures 
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(Dogfahr’s amulet). Think also of Boonmee being attended to 
by the ghost of his wife Huay. The return of these scenes acts 
as a refrain that reminds us of the multiplicity of experience in 
Apichatpong’s films. Each time we see a doctor argue with her 
patient about, say, the efficicacy of a homemade remedy, we 
feel this encounter between different spheres of life all the more 
intensely because the foregone iterations of the refrain vaguely 
Fig. 4: Still from Mysterious Object at Noon, 16 mm (blown up to 35 mm).
Fig. 5: Still from Blissfully Yours.
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return to imbue the actual image with the tone of memory 
and open it towards the future. The cliché, understood as a 
ready-made phrase if we follow its original meaning in relation 
to typesetting, is deflected from dead repetition through its 
activation as a refrain. This refrain has the duplicitous force 
to hold a film together and at the same time create a rift in 
the image that opens it to its predecessors but also to an 
indeterminate to-come.
I pose the problem of consistency in this way to frame my 
discussion of The Adventure of Iron Pussy. Given Apichatpong’s 
recognizable aesthetics, how can one account for a film that 
clearly diverges from his signature style? Do we have to consider 
the film an “inconsistency” within the director’s “oeuvre”? James 
Quandt seems to suggest just that:
Made as a lark on hiatus from Tropical Malady, 
Iron Pussy was cooked up and co-directed by gay 
performance artist Michael Shaowanasai, and, 
though Joe [i.e. Apichatpong] seems very fond of it, 
it is Shaowanasai’s show, despite the many auteurist 
imprints an over-zealous critic can detect. (2009: 58)
Quandt goes to some rhetoric lengths here to all but exclude 
The Adventure of Iron Pussy from Apichatpong’s “oeuvre”. 
Moreover, he deplores the filmmaker’s various collaborative 
endeavors: “Alas, Joe prizes collaboration but sometimes gets 
lost in the process” (Quandt 2009: 60). This is the underlying 
tone of Quandt’s piece on “The Adventure of Iron Pussy and 
Other Collaborations”: he assumes a self-contained artistic 
individuality for a filmmaker who is, in fact, rarely credited as 
“director” and whose films consistently articulate a plurality 
of modes of existence and the leakiness of the individual. 
Perhaps, then, it is through Iron Pussy as the odd one out that 
we can perceive how Apichatpong’s films hold together: “Even 
in a territorial assemblage, it may be the most deterritorialized 
component, the deterritorializing vector, in other words, the 
34 Toni Pape
refrain, that assures the consistency of the territory” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 327).
The Adventure of Iron Pussy: A Time Machine
Iron Pussy is one of Thai performance artist Michael 
Shaowanasai’s various avatars: a former go-go-boy who finds 
his vocation as a transvestite secret agent fighting against 
international crime and for the rights of the downtrodden. 
Pussy’s style and demeanour are inspired by 1960s and ‘70s Thai 
movie legend Petchara Chaowarat. The movie itself is a remix of 
uncountable film clichés, ranging from obsolete genre norms to 
stereotypical characters, from over-the-top musical scenes to a 
cliché ending (including a cliffhanger and a Pietà).
The concept was to simulate the working style of 
the old Thai films of the past. The film is made as 
if composed of the junk left in the trash bins of 
the abandoned Thai film studios. It is designed to 
celebrate the old style of ‘quickie’ cinema that nobody 
makes anymore in contemporary Thai cinema. Among 
the artifacts used were the lost sounds, the dubbed 
voices that are so distant but so cherished in memory. 
(Apichatpong in Quandt 2009: 223)
The Adventure of Iron Pussy is not a parody, nor a caricature. It is 
a “celebration”, a homage to a past that, in its very obsolescence, 
remains touching. How do we have to think the notion of 
simulation and composition here? What does it mean to simulate a 
working style or to as-if-compose a film? 
Cinema always composes with clichés, today perhaps more 
than ever. Watch any superhero film or romantic comedy and 
you can easily spot them. But the clichés of the present easily go 
unnoticed; they circulate surreptitiously because they do their 
job as a narrative device so well. We might not even know our 
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own clichés of the present yet (Sontag 1999: 60). In the case 
of Iron Pussy, however, composition in the mode of the as-if is 
a return to the clichés of the past: they can be reanimated but 
will inevitably bear the ambiguous mark of the ghostly. On the 
one hand, they are impotent in that they no longer give to see 
the world as they did in their own time: as serious, suspenseful, 
action-laden. On the other, and just like ghosts, these clichés 
act in the present by virtue of their quasi-presence: they open 
perception to that which lies beyond the currently given and 
beyond the accepted ways of showing the world in cinema. The 
past returns as potential. Consequently, the notion of simulation 
does not in this case indicate a false reality. When Apichatpong 
and Shaowanasai “simulate the working style of the old Thai films 
of the past”, they immediately create a real difference within 
their lived experience as filmmakers. In this sense, Apichatpong’s 
simulation is not false; rather, it harnesses the powers of the 
false as it “replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because 
it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents” (Deleuze 
1989: 131). Iron Pussy is an opportunity for Apichatpong to inflect 
his mode of living with film. How else can we make a film? What 
are the affordances of “quickie cinema” that other modes of 
filmmaking lack? As-if-composition is to Iron Pussy what the 
exquisite corpse is to Mysterious Object: the enabling constraint 
that allows for a rigorously vague film procedure. They are 
two manifestations of the speculative what-if mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
In Iron Pussy, this procedure consists in a falsification of our tried-
and-tested protocols of composition through an experimentation 
with the worn-out, with that which can only return by differing 
with itself. The difference that is produced in the simulation of an 
obsolete working style is the rediscovery of the joy of filmmaking 
itself. Iron Pussy is not a film that wants to tell a good story; it 
revels in making images. And nothing makes us feel that joy in 
cinema like a film cliché that shamelessly exposes itself. Pussy 
is a trained secret agent: she knows how to do reconnaissance 
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work and stealthily gather information over her shoulder (Fig. 
6); we see her climbing up the wall of a house and immediately 
know that the scene was shot horizontally on a fake wall (Fig. 
7). These shots are all the more delightful because the story 
doesn’t make any sense. Pussy has a number of impossible 
costume changes (from one shot to the next within the same 
scene). On a hunting excursion in the jungle, she saves her love 
interest Tang from a Tiger (!), then confronts him at gunpoint 
Fig. 6: Still from The Adventure of Iron Pussy.
Fig. 7: Still from The Adventure of Iron Pussy.
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about his drug trafficking, only to learn that the two are in fact 
brother and sister. At another moment, Tang uses another spy-
film cliché as he pulls off the maid-supervisor’s face to unmask 
Major Rungranee from the Special Forces Unit who is also his 
betrothed. Betrayal? Yes. And Doublings? Yes! And Tiger attacks? 
Of course! Much as Mysterious Object, Iron Pussy veers from one 
stereotype to another, affirming its vitality in each of them.
How are these feelings of vitality and joy created? It is here that 
Iron Pussy and Mysterious Object diverge and develop their own 
procedures. Both films employ clichés as landing sites but in 
slightly different ways. In Mysterious Object at Noon, the cliché 
provides a safe landing for a story that is precariously suspended 
between narrators. The cliché allows for a gesture of care, in 
which each narrator can acknowledge the act of fabulation and 
the collective of storytellers at the same time. It provides a 
secure discharge for suspense and a familiar point from which 
to continue. The cliché is a moment of contraction, a flash of the 
familiar and settled that lays the ground for a fragile novelty. 
In this sense, the cliché in Mysterious Object at Noon is a relay 
technique that allows for a story to safely circulate within a 
collective. In Iron Pussy, the work of the cliché is not so much 
to create a storytelling relay but to open onto the history of 
filmmaking as a practice. We may never believe in the adventure 
of Iron Pussy, but The Adventure of Iron Pussy makes us believe 
in cinema as a mode of living.2 Each topos of the spy film genre 
contributes to this opening onto the past: a poorly executed cut 
that turns a feeble arm twist into an impressive wrestling throw 
releases countless memories of stylized editing techniques that 
have always been too good to be true. Every fake glass bottle 
that goes down on someone’s head shatters into myriad splinters 
of amusing pasts in which a body could be either knocked out 
by one bottle or survive a dozen gunshot wounds. Each familiar 
shot, cut or gesture continues a holding-open of a cinematic past. 
In The Adventure of Iron Pussy, film history provides a liveable 
milieu for the present.
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The sound of the film is central to sustaining this milieu. It must 
be noted that, contrary to the fullness of ambient sound in most 
of Apichatpong’s films, the soundscape in Iron Pussy is flat and 
artificial. All the voices are dubbed in post-production; each fist 
punch comes with the same sound effect; the music is right out 
of the cheapest synthesizer you can imagine. The film wants its 
viewer to notice the abyss between the image and the sound. 
It is through this odd discrepancy that we realize that this kind 
of film is actually a twofold endeavour. And all of a sudden the 
apparent joy that Shaowanasai takes in posing as Iron Pussy 
is doubled by the banter of the sound artists. While you may 
never hear an authentic sound in the film, you can sense a 
genuine delight in the over-the-top voice acting. When Iron 
Pussy performs a solitary puja by the river, she is interrupted by 
a Buddhist nun: the voice actor’s surprised “huh” in her voice is 
mischievously theatrical, inventing a reaction that can hardly be 
found in Shaowanasai’s acting. This kind of dubbing, a relic of the 
past, is itself an act of fabulation. It complicates and thickens the 
ecology of the film and effectively invents what the film will be. 
In the multiplicity of the creative process, the filmmakers craft an 
aesthetic that is immediately political.
The Politicality of Joy 
The aesthetics of the 1970s action film are immediately political 
because they make us perceive certain concerns of the present 
differently. Through Iron Pussy ’s audiovisuals from the past, 
we get a new perspective on gender normativity and sexuality. 
In fact, the two often intersect in Thai culture: “There’s only 
one word that means both ‘transvestite’ and ‘gay’ in Thai” 
(Apichatpong in Quandt 2009: 58). How, then, does Iron Pussy 
make us perceive this complex of issues differently? To conclude, 
I want to suggest that the film modulates perceptions of gender 
and sexuality through humor and joy.
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Resisting a didactic approach, Iron Pussy never asserts a strict 
distinction between gender and sexuality as a corrective 
to the linguistic and cultural conflation of terms in Thai. It 
harnesses the confusion as a complexity to create openings for 
new individuations. Thus, instead of separating out different 
categories for identification, the film foregrounds the processual 
dimension of the individual. Against a stabilization of identity 
(which has found its political expression in identity politics), 
Iron Pussy shows that self-differentiation is in fact a continuous 
queering. Furthermore, the film shows that thinking and 
perceiving beyond stable identities needn’t be a loss of certainty 
and agency. The individuations of the film are always joyful 
creations that affirm experimentation and potential through 
the body’s becoming. Once again, this is shown particularly well 
in the ambiguous embodiment of Iron Pussy herself: the male 
body in drag and its female voice remain amusingly disjunct 
throughout the film. Even though we can easily think them as 
one character, there is something that persistently exceeds 
this rational consolidation. I believe that the ethico-aesthetic 
consistency of Iron Pussy lies here, in a relation between 
components – male body, female voice – that refuse to connect 
without “com[ing] into effect in excess over themselves” 
(Massumi 2011: 20). This excess is the comedic effect, the joyful 
vibration that the body can’t shake off all through the film. 
Iron Pussy ’s political acumen lies in this interstice between 
established modes of identification, in a “relation-of-nonrelation” 
that is viscerally felt (Massumi 2011: 20). This is not to say that 
Iron Pussy “does not work”. On the contrary, the film works with 
the divergent image and sound to create a joyful appreciation of 
sexual and gender indeterminacy. In this way, The Adventure of 
Iron Pussy harnesses obsolete aesthetic standards to playfully 
generate new and increasingly complex individuations.
There is a politicality to this playfulness and this joy because they 
bypass intellectual discourses on gender and sexuality. Before 
you can resort to received notions of masculinity and femininity, 
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you are already smiling, caught up in the fabulation of Iron Pussy. 
The beautiful feat of this film consists in making its viewers 
unwittingly rethink the potentials of a body through their very 
own bodies. Joyfully moving with the image in your seat, you may 
raise a mischievous eyebrow or purse your sassy lips; you may 
jerk your head with each blow of Pussy’s iron fists as they come 
down on her enemies with a musical kapow! Particles of Pussy’s 
unidentified sex shoot off the screen and prick your body into 
the uncountable alternatives to established gender identities. In 
the encounter, you rediscover your body’s capacity to engender 
“a thousand sexes”, thousands of sexes (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 278).3 This engendering is an open-ended process, in 
excess of what you understand yourself to be. There is always 
another sex to be invented, always a +1. Sexuality vivaciously 
outruns conscious identifications.
In this way, Iron Pussy draws our attention to the futurity that 
animates drag performances in the present. In resonance with 
Deleuze’s concept of fabulation, Judith Butler describes drag 
performances as creating “culturally unintelligible” genders 
belonging to “a set of parodic practices based in performative 
theory of speech acts that disrupt the categories of body, sex, 
gender, and sexuality” (2006: 186–93, xxxiv, emphasis added). 
Because this work focuses on the ways in which drag and other 
parodic practices interfere with established and culturally 
intelligible conceptions of gender, their main achievement is 
thought to consist in disrupting those gender conceptions. 
From this perspective, Iron Pussy challenges our understanding 
of gender as we know it. Yes, and more. From the point of view 
proposed here, one that engages with the immediate experience 
of an image, it becomes clear that new genders are already lived 
before we can even begin to think of them as unintelligible. For Iron 
Pussy, gender is not primarily an epistemological problem but 
one of vitality. Before asking “what will and will not constitute an 
intelligible life” (Butler 2006: xxiii), Pussy raises the question: how 
do you compose your next gender, collectively? This is also why 
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it is so important to think the mismatched image and sound that 
compose Pussy’s body as disjunctive rather than disruptive: the 
disjunctive synthesis of image and sound is creative of a new sex, 
immediately lived with the image. The cut creates life before it 
disrupts knowledge.
What, then, if we began to think, feel and live sexuality from the 
exuberance of the +1? We would be able to recognize the minor 
differences in sexuality between people who previously occupied 
the same gender category, between this straight woman and 
that straight woman, between one transgender person and 
another. We could perceive convergences and divergences across 
the entire field of sexualities that have little to do with gender 
identities. We could resist gender normativity not through 
opposition but by shooting our innumerable minor differences 
through molar gender formations. Adventurers like Iron Pussy 
“produce n molecular sexes on the line of flight in relation to 
the dualism machines they cross right through” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 277). 
What if… The Adventures of Iron Pussy foregrounds speculative 
joy to explore how gender and sexuality can be lived differently. 
Mysterious Object at Noon embraces speculation to ground a 
community not in a discourse of national identity but in the care 
for a collectively told story. These films continue their speculative 
work after the last image has left the screen: within the viewer, 
as a feeling of vitality, life’s enjoyment of itself. To feel the films of 
Apichatpong is to infuse life with the zest of fabulation.
Notes
1. The expression “life-living” is used by Erin Manning in Always More 
Than One to articulate the life’s propensity towards collective indi-
viduation (2013: 60, passim). As such, life-living is closely related to 
Gilles Deleuze’s notion of “a life” with, however, an added emphasis 
on the creative movement of vitality (Deleuze 2006: 384-389).
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2. Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener propose that cinema should 
be thought of as a “life form” (2010: 10). The question arises 
then of how we live with different cinemas. How do or can we live 
with the films of Apichatpong as opposed to rom-coms and su-
perhero movies?
3. The notion of “engendering” is adopted from Manning 
(2007: 84–109).
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One of the reasons why Guattari’s thinking lends itself so well to 
analyzing the aesthetic challenges presented by Apichatpong’s 
cinema is because his schizoanalytic cartography of ontological 
functors machines the production of subjectivity. If by “ontology” 
we take Guattari at his word and insist on it being traversed 
by the four ontological functors, then the term implies a 
hauntology: it is always haunted by the “what if?” of functors 
having functioned differently, which haunt every movement, 
every machination, every bifurcation, every line of flight. The 
singularity of (Thai) history is haunted by the multiplicity from 
which its own becoming emerges. Making felt, and sometimes 
even making seen, the multiplicities that never actualized are key 
to the Weerasethakul-operation and what makes him an archivist 
of abandoned potential, of the virtualities that history failed to 
select in its process of actualization. 
Machines don’t distinguish between the living and the dead: 
either can be put into motion and made to function. Either 
can desire. Deleuze and Guattari’s rereading of the Freudian 
theorizations of Eros and Thanatos applies here:
[I]t is absurd to speak of a death desire that would 
presumably be in qualitative opposition to the life 
desires. Death is not desired, there is only death that 
desires, by virtue of the body without organs or the 
immobile motor, and there is also life that desires, by 
virtue of the working organs. There we do not have 
two desires but two parts, two kinds of desiring-
machine parts, in the dispersion of the machine itself.1
Life and death: two regimes of machinic desire. Once the 
notion of being is approached from the perspective of machinic 
multiplicities, ontology – and even hauntology – takes on an 
entirely different sense. 
Whether hauntology or machinic ontology, both insist on the 
reality of the virtual. Hence the importance of registering the 
presence of non-presence in Derrida’s hauntology and the 
significance of the nth term in Guattari’s schizoanalysis. The 
virtual is a quantum of alterity. That’s exactly why we turn to the 
schizoanalytic cartographies, because by deploying quadrants, 
and insisting on a fourth term in analysis, a cartography 
is opened up onto alterity. The fourth term is the nth term. 
Something – even something spectral, a virtual non-thing – can 
always enter the event, and in relational movement, recompose 
its ontological organization.
By thinking the event of the production of human existence as a 
truly machinic process, any natural distinction between the living 
and the dead starts to dissolve. The living can haunt the dead 
as much as the dead can haunt the living. Are not events always 
“haunted” by the n factor of being’s more-than? 
Is the word “ontology” still appropriate under these conditions of 
machinic ontogenesis? We think it can remain a useful, and vital, 
frame of analysis, as long as the novelty of machinic processes 
is emphasized every step of the way, so as to encourage belief in 
the potential of subjective recomposition based on encounters 
with alterity. 
By privileging the machinic co-composition of the living and 
the dead in the realization of the cinematic-image-as-event, 
the relationship between the felt and the seen takes on a new 
complexity. Because forces need not be seen to be made felt – 
they need not even be “alive” in the organic sense of the term. 
Apichatpong’s ghosts are felt, and this shifts the ontological 
composition of the scene of their (non)presence. In some 
instances, they are also rendered visible, and given corporeal 
form. To a certain degree, that’s why Apichatpong’s images are 
“ecosophically sensitive” – they adopt a range of perceptibility 
that accommodates difference, and different degrees of visibility. 
But the being made visible of the ghosts which populate 
Apichatpong’s world is not entirely congruent with their being 
made felt. There are indefinite animals, ghosts, and spirits who 
are felt throughout the film world – even if they never actually, 
visually appear. Once you are absorbed in Apichatpong’s film 
world, it is impossible not to feel them all around!
That which is made seen is only ever the cusp of all that is felt. 
Not that the seen represents, or stands in for all that is felt. 
But rather it carries the affective charge of all of the multiple 
and virtual intensities that traverse and intersect it. Watching 
Apichatpong’s films, we know there are other monkey-ghosts 
populating the jungle, because we can feel them even if we can 
never see them. This phenomenon can be taken as a cinematic 
variant of what Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus: that 
we never make love with each other, we make love to worlds.2 So 
when the spectral is given visibility, it makes an entire range of 
spectrality felt along with it, even if it remains hidden by opacity. 
Boonsong isn’t an individual monkey-ghost, he is the enunciatory 
limit of an endangered, or even extinct, species – an entire 
world of collective spectrality that is inseperable from his very 
existence and that his being seen makes felt in a myriad of ways 
(découpage, long takes, etc.): a true haunting of his being by the 
excess of the world that machinically produces it. 
Ghosts don’t need to be made seen in order for the image to 
have enough contact with the radical alterity of the outside 
(including the force of “other” temporalities/histories) to prove 
themselves amenable to recomposition. It’s precisely this 
metastability, this openness to the outside implicit in actual 
formations, which politicizes Apichatpong’s work since it truly 
believes that the world is up for grabs, and that interventions 
(whether they be filmic or meditative) make a real difference. 
Peace is at once a pragmatics of belief and commitment: a belief 
in the potential for subjective recomposition (a broadening of 
feeling) and a commitment to remaining open to an encounter 
with alterity that could bring it about.
Notes
1. Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, vol. 1. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. 
Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 329.
2. Ibid. 294.
Adam Szymanski
Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives 
and the Ecosophic Aesthetics of Peace
The fantastical population of Apichatpong’s film worlds – the 
mystical creatures, benevolent ghosts and talking animals 
who repeatedly appear and disappear in their travelling of 
time – offer an oblique access point into Thailand’s war-torn 
history, especially the American-backed military occupation and 
communist purging of Isaan province that took place from the 
1960s through to the 1980s. As a child, Apichatpong became 
intimately familiar with the region and its history after his 
parents relocated their medical practices to the province out of 
solidarity with its leftist organizing. He witnessed that amidst 
the violence of the occupation, villagers threatened by the 
military fled their homes and hid in the jungle.1 Many of them 
never returned. Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives is 
set in Isaan,2 and is premised on the affective-historical fact that 
the region’s purging is still felt by the widows and descendants 
of the disappeared communists, despite the reigning royalist 
regime’s attempts to silence and censor this history in the name 
of national unity.3
Isaan is thus a site of conflicted signification in Thai culture. 
As a principally rural and agricultural province it lends itself to 
signifying as “rural utopia” and “cornerstone of Thai heritage”, 
two ideological discourses taken up by forces as opposed as 
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left-wing intellectuals and royalist-nationalists (Boehler 2011: 
293). In defiance of these national heritage discourses, the 
rural space of the Isaan jungle simultaneously signifies as 
anti-nation4 because of the region’s historical association with 
communist resistance (and its ties to various ethnic minorities 
in Thailand such as the Chinese and Laotians).5 Uncle Boonmee 
does more than signify on one side of this ideological conflict 
between nation and anti-nation, geopolitical centre and margin, 
royalist and communist. In defiance of censorship threats 
and distribution difficulties in Thailand, Apichatpong’s cinema 
endeavours to bring back the disappeared peoples who were 
driven into the jungle and lost to military aggression and to make 
reverberate the ethos that the government tried to extinguish 
when it disappeared the people of Isaan. From the heart of the 
jungle – a blot on the Thai political unconscious – Uncle Boonmee 
recomposes the thresholds of the three ecologies, and in doing 
so, brings repressed cultural memories out of obscurity to bear 
on a society that has had great difficulty acknowledging the 
willed omissions of its history, including the peoples and values 
that have been lost.
Ecosophy as a Call for Peace
Human subjectivity, the socius and the environment together 
constitute what Félix Guattari calls “the three ecologies”. The 
practice of ethically-politically thinking the pragmatics of their 
co-composition is called “ecosophy”, and its chief problematic “is 
that of the production of human existence itself in new historic 
contexts” (Guattari 2008: 24). It is possible to read Guattari’s 
late works on ecosophy as a call for “peace”, at least in the sense 
that A.N. Whitehead gives to the word. As process theologist 
Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore points out, Whiteheadian peace 
“is not the absence of war and violence, but the presence of 
other relationships ([in Whitehead’s words,] ‘a broadening of 
feeling’) with the wider world” (Mullino Moore 2006: 205). Finding 
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more heteropoetic ways of living with the “other” in “other 
relationships” is central to the ethico-political task of ecosophy, 
and its therapeutic investment in the production of subjectivity. 
The Three Ecologies concludes with an appeal for a revitalized 
relationship to alterity, “new social and aesthetic practices, new 
practices of the Self in relation to the other, to the foreign, the 
strange [...] new solidarities, a new gentleness […] Individuals 
must become both more united and increasingly different” 
(Guattari 2008: 45, 51). With a similar concern for the value of 
alterity, Isabelle Stengers builds on Guattari’s ecosophy to define 
“peace as the ecological production of actual togetherness 
where ‘ecological’ means the aim is not toward a unity beyond 
differences, which would reduce those differences through a 
goodwill reference to abstract principles of togetherness, but 
toward the creation of concrete, interlocked, asymmetrical, and 
always partial graspings” (Stengers 2002: 248–9). To compose 
peace is to compose togetherness-in-difference, to assemble a 
collective that holds, not in spite, but because of its differences in 
a way that broadens the affective range of collective experience.
Encounters with alterity are opportunities for surpassing 
established subject positions. The adventurous character of 
peace – its broadening of feeling – comes about through this 
encounter with alterity, where self and other cease to be what 
they were by bringing a novel event of relation into existence. 
Whitehead writes: 
Peace is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence 
of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and 
yet momentous in its coordination of values. Its first 
removal is the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from 
the soul’s preoccupation with itself. Peace carries with 
it a surpassing of personality. […] Peace is the removal 
of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a 
wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the 
field of attention. Thus Peace is self-control at its 
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widest, – at the width where the ‘self’ has been lost, 
and interest has been transferred to coordinations 
wider than personality. […] Peace is the barrier against 
narrowness. (Whitehead 1967: 285)
By broadening feeling and widening consciousness to 
encompass the play of differences that engender an ecology, 
peace re-coordinates the values governing the production of 
subjectivity, resulting in a jouissance of collective reindividuation 
that recasts the world’s quantum of potential for cohabitation. 
Two scenes in Uncle Boonmee are particularly illustrative of 
how Apichatpong uses ecosophic aesthetics to visualize the 
processual emergence of such a peace. The first alters its range 
of perceptibility – and feeling – in order to visualize various 
degrees of alterity under one ecologically sensitive image. It 
clears the way for one of the film’s concluding scenes, which 
finally accomplishes the implementation of peace and the 
overcoming of reified personality through the aesthetic creation 
of an event that shocks the coordinates of selfhood; coordinates 
that had started to loosen as soon this alterious collective from 
the first scene came into existence. Apichatpong’s aesthetic 
composition with the imperceptible makes return a repressed 
ethico-political force that reconditions the ontological functors 
immanent to the three ecologies in the service of actualizing a 
novel sense of peace.6
Encountering Alterity, Broadening Feeling
The first exemplary scene depicts the film’s protagonist, Uncle 
Boonmee (Thanapat Saisaymar), an ill plantation owner, his 
sister-in-law Jen (Jenjira Pongpas), and his nephew Tong (Sakda 
Kaewbuadee) calmly eating dinner inside of a windowless 
veranda. Then, out of nowhere, a ghost materializes. It turns out 
to be Huay (Natthakarn Aphaiwonk), Boonmee’s deceased wife. 
Overcoming their initial surprise, the three characters speak 
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with her about Boonmee’s illness and impending death, until 
they are joined by an even more surprising guest. This time it’s 
(what the subtitles refer to as) a “monkey-ghost” with bright red 
eyes, covered head-to-toe in thick black hair. The monkey-ghost 
claims to be Boonsong (Geerasak Kulhong), Boonmee and Huay’s 
long-lost son who went missing after taking a trip into the jungle 
many years ago.
This scene, like the entire film, is entirely devoid of point of view 
shots. In their absence, the various depersonalized forces active 
within the ecology of the film world come to guide the logic 
of the relationship between shots, constituting an ecosophic 
découpage (and corresponding editing structure).7 There is action 
to propel the scene’s formal organization, yet this action is as 
driven by memories, ghosts, far-off sounds and animals as it is 
by any human-centered drama. The logic of Apichatpong’s cut is 
irrational from the point of view of the human subject and can 
only be accounted for through a consideration of the unknown 
and the unseen that are made felt in the broader ecology. The 
scene’s découpage spatially situates the different characters 
within their broader environment and temporally situates them 
with regards to their past transformations. It opens with a long 
shot of a veranda, as seen from the surrounding jungle (Fig. 8). 
The interior space marks the only source of light amidst the long 
shot of the dark rural area. The characters’ voices are heard in 
the distance. Cut to inside the veranda, the cinematography 
squarely lines up within its box-shaped architectural form (Fig. 
9). The camera moves in closer to compose medium shots of the 
three characters sitting at a table (Fig. 10, 11, 12 and 13). Then 
the film mounts a dark landscape shot with the veranda now 
completely out of frame, decentered in an unknown direction 
(Fig. 14). The sound of an approaching storm rumbles across the 
soundtrack before the film cuts to an adjacent shot of bushes 
swaying and rustling. “What’s that sound?” one of the characters 
asks, before a cut back inside, to the original medium shot of 
the table (Fig. 15). The subsequent few shots show Boonsong’s 
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Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig. 10
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Fig. 11
Fig. 12
Fig. 13
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entrance. On the axis of spatiality, the cutaway shots of the 
mountain, bushes, and neon bug-zappers break from human-
centered schemas of scopic organization that coordinate the 
ecology according to an anthropocentric hierarchy of value. The 
localized, character-driven action is fragmented and repositioned 
by the active presence of the adjacent environment just outside 
the veranda.
The scene also intensively channels Boonsong’s mental 
interiority, his recollection of the events that have brought him to 
where he is today and made him what he has become. When he 
recounts the story of his past transformations, the camera takes 
on a new fluidity, which is abruptly juxtaposed with the scene’s 
darkness and rigidity (Fig. 16). Through a découpage equally 
sensitive to material and mental intensity, the past is made an 
ecological force. The film sees beyond the actuality of any given 
plane of temporality and instead renders visible their mutual 
co-composition of the film world. The present is coloured with 
a splash of pastness, as Boonsong’s recollection interjects into 
the dinner table gathering and its environmental surround. In 
beginning to recount his story, Boonsong says, “There are many 
beings outside right now… spirits and hungry animals, like me.” 
As a sensitive character in an equally sensitive film ecology, he 
can feel them, even if he can’t see them. Boonsong’s story recalls 
how he transformed from an ordinary human photographer to a 
red-eyed monkey-ghost after he became obsessed with finding 
the strange creature that had once appeared in the background 
of one of his landscape photographs. The images of the past 
that accompany Boonsong’s recollection appear as a shared 
collective heritage. There are no clichéd wipes or dissolves, 
only an abrupt cut from a shot behind the back of Jen’s head to 
Boonsong’s human form inside of a dark room for photography 
development (Fig. 17). The cut is prompted by his narration of the 
story, words that all of the characters hear. These images are not 
psychologized, residing inside of Boonsong’s head. These images, 
as much as they make up Boonsong’s experience and memory, 
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Fig. 17
Fig. 18
Fig. 19
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are exteriorized and socialized – made a concrete part of the 
shared ecology (to the extent that they can even be affected by 
others in the scene). At one point in the recollection, Jen says 
“excuse me” and gets up from the table to go sit on a nearby 
bench. The recollection immediately stops and cuts back to the 
present (Fig. 18 and 19). All of the characters at the table have 
access to the recollection and the ability to stop it, because the 
recollection doesn’t belong solely to Boonsong, entrenched in an 
inaccessible past. It belongs to their shared ecology. Memories 
affect others, and in Apichatpong’s ecosophical aesthetics, 
others can affect memories. 
The ecosophic logic of the découpage described above 
diverges from découpage en plan américain (also called classical 
découpage); the logic of the relationship between shots that 
governs most classical Hollywood cinema.8 Under the classical 
system, character-driven shot sequences advance a narrative 
that reproduces visual codes predicated on stock character 
behaviour, gaze, and movement. This shooting style is most often 
contrasted with découpage en profondeur (shooting in depth). In 
découpage en profondeur each plane of depth within the shot 
is in equally sharp focus and part of what excited André Bazin 
about this artistic development was its ability to “embrace the 
totality of the event” (Bazin 1997: 103, translation modified). 
In the oft-cited Wellesian vein of découpage en profondeur, 
background planes of action complexify and enrich the story and 
allow for an expanded number of associations between elements 
in a single shot to be drawn by the spectator, all without recourse 
to montage. Uncle Boonmee is exemplary of découpage en 
profondeur, but with a key exception: it has no background to 
be in or out of focus. It has an “outside”, a blacked-out zone of 
metamorphosis9 without concrete form that puts the foreground 
of character drama into contact with the indetermination of pure 
opacity.10 Ghosts (who used to be human) emerge from this zone 
of opacity where the jungle lies, and they come out into the light. 
They are made visible and their memories are depersonalized 
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and made equally accessible to all, provoking a shift in the 
scene’s ontological consistency. 
Guattari’s Schizoanalytic Cartographies advances the theory 
that each assemblage of enunciation, or event, is composed 
of four ontological functors that together give the assemblage 
its ontological consistency. These functors include existential 
Territories (T), Fluxes of materiality (F), machinic Phyla of 
diagrammatic organization (Θ) and incorporeal Universes of 
value (U). In a passage from Guattari’s Diagrammatic Thought 
worth quoting at length, Janell Watson provides a very clear 
and useful summary of the functors that undergird the myriad 
cartographies of Guattari’s schizoanalytic thought experiments:
Fluxes include physical matter and physical signals; 
these are subject to the coordinates of energetic 
quanta, space, and time. The abstract machinic Phyla 
comprise evolution; Guattari’s deterritorializing 
abstract machines; and blueprints, plans, diagrams, 
rules and regulation (in the cybernetic sense of 
control mechanisms). Existential Territories include 
subjective identity, the sense of self, and existential 
‘apprehension.’ The incorporeal Universes of reference 
are made up of values, nondiscursive references, and 
virtual possibility; these ‘escape the energetic, legal, 
evolutionary, and existential coordinates of the three 
preceding domains.’ (Watson 2009: 99)
Cinematographic images, like any other event of perception, 
are assemblages of enunciation produced through the 
co-composition of each of the four ontological functors. 
Firstly, images have a material basis in the Fluxes: signifying 
and asignifying visual and aural material made up of colours, 
bodies, movements, landscapes, and text. These cinematic 
Fluxes function in the realm of sensuous perceptibility. The 
machinic Phyla can be read as the set of organizing principles 
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at work in an image. Depending on the image, there could be 
many of these operating at once, in sync or in opposition to 
one another. Organizing principles can refer to generic and 
industrial standards, national cinema traditions, and intertextual 
references, in addition to the social norms and conventions 
that may be relayed through a film’s dissemination. Both Fluxes 
and Phyla lie on the side of the actual. Incorporeal Universes 
and existential Territories contribute to the image virtually. The 
Territories inform how characters within the filmic world are 
positioned, often through the granting or denying of scopic 
agency via point-of-view shots. Finally, Universes of value inflect 
the image’s horizon of references and the coordination of value, 
giving sense to character subjectivities (T), image intensities (F), 
and the governing structures of the film (Θ). Together, the four 
ontological functors co-compose the filmic reality.11 
For the sake of clarity, the ontological functors have been 
described separately, but they are never in fact separate. 
An assemblage of enunciation is dynamically composed out 
of the reality of the relation immanent to its functioning. In 
Guattari’s own words: “They will only be able to sustain their 
own configurations through the relations that they entertain 
with each other; they will be required to change state and status 
as a function of their overall Assemblage” (Guattari 2013: 27). 
In order live up to its name, a functor must indeed function – 
it must move. Starting from a movement in any one of these 
quadrants, an entire ecology can be reworked (for an ecology 
is fundamentally an assemblage of enunciation). Or rather, an 
entire ecology can’t help but be reworked by one of the functors’ 
very functioning, precisely because the functioning of a functor is 
simultaneously a relational movement between the four.12
Uncle Boonmee ’s dinner table scene offers an idiosyncratic 
take on depth of field (nourished by the opacity of the outside) 
to invite consideration of its ontological depth. From this 
perspective, whole domains of desire imperceptible on the 
The Ecosophic Aesthetics Of Peace 61
surface of the image are if not “brought to light” and rendered 
sensuously perceptible then at least brought nonsensuously to 
thought, in their opacity. Each of the four ontological functors 
is active in the cinematographic image, but only the Fluxes are 
sensuously perceptible. The domain of Fluxes is both actual 
and real, whereas the machinic Phyla, incorporeal Universes 
of value and existential Territories are all inflected by either 
the nonsensuous realms of the possible or the virtual.13 The 
aesthetic strategy of this scene makes the ontological depth 
of Apichatpong’s film world felt, without needing to visually 
represent all that is virtually active yet out of sight.14 The 
spontaneous arrival of alterity is certainly registered by the 
Fluxes, as the image alters its range of perceptibility in order 
to accommodate the bodies that emerge from the darkness 
of the jungle. Huay’s translucent ghost body is registered right 
next to Boonsong who is covered in pitch-black fur. This feat 
in découpage completely alters the semiotic arrangement (F) 
of the image in a manner that allows for diverse forms of life 
and modes of existence (ghosts, animals, disappeared peoples) 
to be convoked by the very same image. If this actual semiotic 
arrangement is an index of anything, it is an index of the virtual 
movements of the four ontological functors in the process 
of recomposition, and not an index of a pre-existing reality 
(the profilmic). With the collective emergence convoked, the 
abstract machine (Θ) governing the possibility of the event’s 
actual development is different than it was before. The table 
that originally arranged the characters around it in the act 
of eating together has become a locus for the emergence 
of difference harboured by opacity. The real virtual domain 
of diegetic subjectivity (T) is also altered by the unlikely 
appearances of Huay and Boonsong – the group subjectivity 
shifts in composition, as two others fold into the scene. Through 
this mutual inclusion, notions of family, togetherness, and 
collectivity take on meanings that extend across species and 
the divide between life and death. In conjunction with all of 
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this movement, which create a new ontological consistency, 
Boonmee comes to regret his anti-communist violence and 
attributes his liver disease to the bad karma of these past 
actions. The family’s relational dynamics are renewed and they 
take on a new collective character, accommodating alterious 
forms of life and modes of existence along with memories and 
premonitions, and whole virtual universes of value that these 
degrees of difference bring into the scene. The renewal is so 
profound as to constitute a “group subject”, in that it becomes 
a group “that respects the heterogeneity of its component 
parts, and does not try to subsume them under an illusion of 
unity; that it is a group in process that explores and changes 
as conditions change, instead of hardening into a paralytic 
hierarchy of mutually exclusive terms with assigned value” 
(Massumi 1988: 440). Values (U), qualities of virtual possibility, 
are also modified in the recomposition of group subjectivity, 
because when Boonsong and Huay emerge from the jungle they 
carry a repressed set of political values and cultural memories 
with them. The jungle – a space of hiding, fleeing and taking 
cover for the communists liquidated by the military invasion of 
Isaan province – is here a point of emergence. Boonsong and 
Huay are different when they come out of the jungle, having 
been transformed by the unrepresentable horrors that took 
place within it. Emerging and asserting the difference of one’s 
metamorphosis is an unrepresentable historical testimony that 
demands to be accommodated in the scene of presence. Shifting 
to accommodate the expressive presence of the repressed is 
a relational movement of the four ontological functors that 
alters the assemblage of enunciation, resingularizing the 
three ecologies. A small group’s subjective orientation shifts, 
making peace with the alterious re-emergence of remnants 
from an opaque past made virtually active and nonsensuously 
perceptible. The schizoanalytic cartography demands to be 
redrawn once more, to account for this broadening of feeling that 
we could call peace.
The Ecosophic Aesthetics Of Peace 63
Disappearing/Reappearing: Surpassing Personality
Uncle Boonmee and a number of other short films and 
installations from Apichatpong’s Primitive project15 extensively 
use images of male teenage youth from Nabua, a “town of 
widows”, that suffered immensely at the hands of the military 
occupation and communist purging.16 The choice of teenage 
boys is significant since they are the descendants of the 
disappeared men and are orphans of the town of widows. Their 
presence carries the legacy of their disappeared fathers and 
widowed mothers along with the story of their past struggles 
for communism. In another important scene that facilitates the 
implementation of peace, Boonmee has a nightmarish “dream 
of the future” where “past people are made to disappear”. 
The scene uncannily invokes what Walter Benjamin has to say 
about the ephemerality of historical images: “Every image of 
the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its 
own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably” (Benjamin 
2007: 255). Uncle Boonmee shows how Benjamin’s observation 
is true yet incomplete. Yes, the present carries a selective 
function; selecting presence – or what Whitehead calls the 
actual occasion17 – out of the possibilities that a given process 
has made available to it. Yet what Uncle Boonmee adds to this 
account is that the present not only chooses which images to 
remember and forget based on its own concerns, but that the 
presence of an image, or a remembering, can doubly conceal a 
disappearance, an active forgetting. The forced disappearance 
of Isaan communists during the Thai military invasion is a prime 
example. As a people made to disappear, their image is charged 
with that very disappearance, to the extent that in order to 
maintain the status quo, such an image must be concealed 
and censored, even to the point of the image’s (and not just 
the people’s) disappearance. The disappearance of the image 
of Isaan communists in Thailand cannot at all be accounted for 
based on the fact that the present does not see it as one of its 
own concerns. Conversely, the very fact of the communists’ 
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disappearance, along with the disappearance of their image, can 
be attributed to them being a pressing concern to the current 
Thai political context. The present, so concerned that such an 
image could usher in a new ethico-political consistency that calls 
for making peace with this lingering past, restricts the conditions 
for its appearance. Maybe after long enough the present will 
no longer need to repress this image if the social landscape 
has changed to such a degree that its reappearance loses the 
power to shock subjectivity. In any case, Apichatpong’s work 
is a high-stakes wager on the chance that the reappearance of 
the disappeared, this making active of the past, can prompt 
ecological recomposition.18 
Boonmee’s “dream of the future” enacts this wager. On the eve 
of his death, Boonmee, the ghost of his ex-wife Huan, his sister-
in-law Jen, and Tong (the same characters from the dinner table 
scene) make a pilgrimage to an enormous cave where Boonmee 
enters a divinatory reverie. The dream is conveyed through 
ten still photographs that disrupt the film’s live-action flow. 
Boonmee’s voiceover monologue reads as follows:
Boonmee: What’s wrong with my eyes. They are open 
but I can’t see a thing? Or are my eyes closed?
Jen: Maybe you need time for your eyes to adjust 
to the dark.
Boonmee: This cave is like a womb, isn’t it? I was born 
here in a life I can’t recall. I only know that I was born 
here. I don’t know if I was a human or an animal, a 
woman or a man.
[Dream sequence of ten still photographs begins]
Boonmee: Last night, I dreamt of the future. I arrived 
there in a sort of time machine. The future city was 
ruled by an authority able to make anybody disappear. 
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When they found ‘past people,’ they shone a light at 
them. That light projected images of them onto the 
screen. From the past, until the arrival in the future. 
Once those images appeared, these ‘past people’ 
disappeared. I was afraid of being captured by the 
authorities because I had many friends in this future. I 
ran away. But wherever I ran, they still found me. They 
asked me if I knew this road. I told them I didn’t know. 
And then I disappeared. 
The monologue is interlaced with ten still photos which can be 
briefly described as follows:
Photo one: In a straw coloured open field, a person in an ape 
suit with a rope tied around its neck is led by a young man in 
paramilitary attire (Fig. 20).
Photo two: A medium close-up shot of three young soldiers 
laying on the grass. The pattern of the shadows that cover them 
resemble the pattern of their camouflage uniforms (Fig. 21). 
Photo three: An eaten away tree leaf takes on the texture of the 
camouflage pattern and hangs in-between the faces of three 
young soldiers and the chest of another (Fig. 22). 
Photo four: Again, two soldiers lying on the ground amidst the 
bushes with the rifles resting beside them. They camouflage into 
their green and brown surroundings (Fig. 23). 
Photo five: A large group of military men dispersed throughout 
a field similar to the one seen in the first photo. A mysterious 
orange (human? animal?) figure walks in the background (Fig. 24). 
Photo six: Medium straight-on shot of the ape figure roped up by 
the neck, held by the soldier seen in the first photo. They are still 
in the same field (Fig. 25). 
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Photo seven: The same young men, now dressed in civilian attire, 
throw stones out of frame to the right. Is the ape figure the 
target (Fig. 26)?
Photo eight: The ape figure with his arms around a group of six 
armed soldiers, looking directly at the camera as if posing for a 
group photo  (Fig. 27). 
Photo nine: Five of the young men take a photo of a shirtless 
sixth laying out on the ground. Is he dead or alive (Fig. 28)? 
Photo ten: Crop circles on a dirt path (Fig. 29).
Fig. 20
Fig. 21
The Ecosophic Aesthetics Of Peace 67
Fig. 24
Fig. 23
Fig. 22
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Fig. 25
Fig. 26
Fig. 27
The Ecosophic Aesthetics Of Peace 69
The phrasing of Boonmee’s voiceover suggests that he is the 
ape figure – possibly a man inside of an ape suit – who arrives 
in the future “wearing” a different body. However, this is merely 
one possible interpretation. He could very well be one of the 
soldiers, one of the civilians, the group as a whole, or even the 
photographer of the images. There is a real uncertainty as to 
where to locate him in his own dream, which fits in completely 
with the ecosophic logic of the dinner table scene’s découpage. 
Boonmee’s dream is not really his dream at all. The sunny 
photographs of the dream rip through the slowly paced and 
opacity filled images of the present in a manner that parallels 
Fig. 28
Fig. 29
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Boonsong’s earlier recollection. The dream is not localized within 
Boonmee’s psyche, cordoned off from the world. It surpasses 
Boonmee’s personality, enters into the shared ecology. 
Boonmee is not even identifiable in “his own” dream; he can 
barely recognize himself in it. It makes little difference whether 
Boonmee is in fact the ape, the soldiers, or the photographer 
taking the pictures of these characters – Boonmee cannot find 
himself in the future. The impossibility of being identified in a 
dream of one’s “own” future proves unbearable to one’s self. 
Boonmee sees the future as a time where a pervasive conflict 
plays out between the people of the future and the people of the 
past. Even if it remains undetermined exactly where he figures 
in the dream, or what body he identifies with, he is nevertheless 
there, as are Jen, Tong and Huay. They are enmeshed in a future 
where they do not have a defined place, and yet they are 
implicated in its inter-generational and inter-species violence. The 
prospect of living in a future completely incompatible with one’s 
notion of both “self” and “future” instigates a reappraisal of them 
both. The future becomes a site in dire need of reconfiguration 
along the lines of a new ontological consistency of peace, in order 
to make room for the appearance of the self. Yet the very notion 
of self will need to become other than it presently is in order 
to fabricate the future condition for its own habitability. For it 
is largely humankind’s unyielding will to dominate difference 
that led to the prospect of a future where alterity is suffocated 
to begin with (in other words, a future not so different from 
the past). Boonmee and his companions are caught in a double 
bind: cease to exist or exist amidst the uninhabitable. Making 
this realization shocks their subjectivity (T). Having shaken 
the existential territory of the self, the future needs to be 
re-speculated, accounting for this quality of functional alterity 
that has rendered the ecology slightly more accommodating and 
less self-assured. 
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Now that Boonmee’s sense of self has been rattled by the 
shock of the dream, new possibilities for the organization 
of ontological consistency have been ushered in. Peace is 
given a chance. Here, in Apichatpong’s cinema, the sons of 
the “town of widows”, marginalized and invisible in the Thai 
political landscape, claim a presence that defies their historical 
disappearance. Diegetically, Boonmee is shocked and this visual 
confrontation forces him to reassess his very sense of self on 
the eve of his death. He can no longer rationalize and justify 
the actions of his past (which included purging the communists 
of Isaan), now that he sees a future in which his fate could 
be as arduous as theirs. Uncle Boonmee has made the absent 
present and the ontological consistency of the film’s images 
has broadened feeling to accommodate the disappeared, in all 
of their alterity. Apichatpong uses aesthetic experimentation 
to more fully perceive the movement of the ecology in order to 
make peace with those whose existence has been denied, whose 
way of life has been extinguished and whose values have been 
denigrated. Uncle Boonmee has listened to the disappeared – 
those who were killed and whose memory has been excluded 
from official nationalist discourse – and has given them presence 
by expanding its range of perceptibility. The speculative risk of 
the film, which brings back the disappeared in defiance of the 
powers-that-be, is that such a modulation on the plane of the 
image, a modulation that brings the disappeared to perceptibility 
and enunciation can, when seeded in the world and into the 
Thai mediascape, provoke a similar type of modulation. Putting 
the ontological functors immanent to the film image in touch 
with the functors of the world in which the film lives and 
circulates: the force of art in life. As such, Uncle Boonmee carries 
the potential to broaden feeling towards an ethico-political 
paradigm of peace that surpasses personality yet respects the 
right to singularity, and thus cares for the alterious contrasts 
of the world, even the ones which have not yet been made 
to (re)appear.
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Notes
1. For an autobiographical account of Apichatpong’s intimate relation-
ship to the occupation and more anecdotes about the role that the 
jungle plays in Apichatpong’s engagement with the Thai political 
unconscious, see “The Memory of Nabua. A Note on the Primitive 
Project” (2009a: 192–206).
2. Isaan is still today one of the most economically disadvantaged 
regions of Thailand, making it a bastion of red shirt sympathies with 
an antagonistic relationship to yellow shirt urbanites. In 2005–2006 
the Thai People’s Alliance for Democracy or colloquially, the Yellow 
Shirts, organized mass protests against former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra resulting in a coup d’état. The pro- and anti-
Thaksin tensions continue to dominate the Thai political landscape 
with a subsequent political crisis in 2008 and yet another coup 
d’état which deposed Thaksin’s younger sister and business mag-
nate Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014.
3. Censorship is an active challenge to politicized filmmaking in 
Thailand, and Apichatpong Weerasethakul is one of the nation’s 
most prominent voices of opposition to the censorship legisla-
tion in place. The Motion Pictures and Video Act B.E. 2551 (2008) 
recently modified the 1930 Film Act and implemented a new rat-
ing system, yet it still allows for the state to ban films from being 
shown in the Kingdom if they are deemed by the National Film 
and Video Committee (which includes the nation’s chief of police) 
to “undermine social order or moral decency, or that might have 
an impact on the security and pride of the nation” (Rithdee 2007). 
For Apichatpong’s critique of the (then proposed) legislation, see 
Weerasethakul (2009b). 
4. Philip Rosen (1996) sets up the nation/anti-nation dialectic in order 
to emphasize how there exists an anti-national component that 
always troubles national cinemas.
5. See Casella (1970) for a historical account of how communist 
insurgency in Thailand is tied to the political activities of Chinese 
and Vietnamese minorities based in Khon Kaen (the city where 
Apichatpong would later grow up). Alpern (1975) also outlines the 
ethnic and linguistic makeup of the northeast and its importance to 
the Communist Party of Thailand’s guerrilla strategies in the 1950s–
60s. Thomas (1986) traces the rise and decline of Communist Party 
organization in Thailand from the 1960s through to the 1980s.
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6. I use the term “repressed” here because it best articulates the psy-
chic and social character of the targeted militarized purging seen in 
Isaan province. In Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter “Social Repression 
and Psychic Repression” in Anti-Oedipus (1983) they detail how 
psychic repression and social repression reproduce and reinforce 
one another, in order to prevent desire’s revolutionary force from 
disrupting established social structures. This psychosocial concep-
tion of repression posits that both desiring production and repres-
sion are inherently collective acts which condition the life of an 
ecology and thus overrun the limits of Freud’s individualized subject 
who possess a personalized unconscious of repressed desires. Thus 
my use of the term repression throughout this paper should not 
be confused with repression as used in the more limited Freudian 
sense, wherein repression is “an operation whereby the subject 
attempts to repel, or to confine to the unconscious, representa-
tions (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to an instinct. 
Repression occurs when to satisfy an instinct – though likely to be 
pleasurable in itself – would incur the risk of provoking unpleasure 
because of other requirements” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988: 390). 
7. I use the term “découpage” here mostly in the Bazinian spirit of 
the term that Timothy Barnard evokes in his updated translation 
of What is Cinema? For Barnard’s Bazin, découpage is “editing’s 
corollary at the mise-en-scène stage of production” and a way of 
“organizing the profilmic” (2009: 265, 279). Bazin has also referred 
to découpage as “composition and camera movement” (2009: 264) 
and as “the aesthetic of the relationship between shots” (as they 
are conceived, Barnard tells us, not as they are edited) (2009: 264). 
Elsewhere, Noël Burch (1981: 4) has described découpage as the 
“underlying structure of the finished film”, which Barnard argues 
should in fact be called “formal treatment” (2009: 264). In spite of 
Burch’s apparent blindness to the fact that the process of découp-
age starts long before the film is finished and can be used to discuss 
creative aspects of film production, Burch’s notion of “underlying 
structure” best encapsulates how découpage can be seen and felt 
in a film. In the following analysis my use of the term then borrows 
from both Burch and Barnard as I use the term to speak simulta-
neously of the film’s underlying formal structure (of which editing 
certainly plays a part in determining), its shot composition, as well 
as the aesthetic relationship between shots as they are conceived 
and then edited in line with this guiding directorial vision. I opt to 
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analyze the film’s “découpage” rather than solely its “editing” be-
cause “découpage” holds onto the importance of shot composition 
(which is inextricable from how a film like this is structured and later 
edited) and also because it recognizes that the film’s underlying 
structure is given birth in the filmmaker’s mind before being shot, 
and that the editing of the film is then carried out in line with this 
original vision, in order to actualize it, rather than suppress it, by 
cutting it up into short takes that are easily digested by the commer-
cial spectator.
8. Découpage en plan américain refers to the logic of shot organization 
at work in classical Hollywood studio era productions. See the chap-
ter on découpage in David Bordwell’s History of Film Style (1997) for a 
discussion of this term (which contrasts quite sharply with Timothy 
Barnard’s later usage of the term découpage in Bazin 2009).
9. For Deleuze, the outside is “always an opening onto a future [where] 
nothing ends, since nothing has begun, but everything is trans-
formed” (Deleuze 1988: 89).
10. While the opacity of the outside may not be a background, it nev-
ertheless “re-introduces ambiguity into the structure of the image”, 
which for Bazin is one of the defining traits of découpage en profond-
eur (1997: 101).
11. Reality is here understood in a different sense than it often acquires 
within film studies discussions of realism. In these discussions, what 
scholars who use the term reality really mean, is a more specialized 
notion of the term that could be called “profilmic reality”. Profilmic 
reality is a term that comes from the work of Étienne Souriau and 
refers to the world that exists before the camera, which the camera 
then records (see Souriau’s L’Univers filmique (1953: 8). When I use 
the term reality here, I am speaking of an entirely different relation-
ship between image and reality. What interests me is not how the 
camera adheres to a profilmic reality, or even how the camera is 
productive of reality (which studies of direct cinema documentaries 
have so frequently pointed out), but that the reality of the image 
is informed by ontological functors. The Fluxes of the image are 
really the only domain that exists in a reciprocal relationship with 
the profilmic reality. Values, Phlya, and the existential Territories of 
the self remain sensuously imperceptible, yet all still go into produc-
ing the reality of the image – what it really contains, what it really 
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expresses, what it really does, and what effects it may really pro-
duce in the world.
12. Erin Manning deploys the term relational movement to emphasize 
movement’s metastable and creative quality of “worlding”. For 
Manning, the relational movement of bodies in space literally cre-
ates the world in which the movement happens (creates the world 
through movement). For a discussion on relational movement, see 
Manning (2009). I use the term here to emphasize how the creative 
act of bringing a world into existence emerges immanent to the 
movement of the ontological functors at work in a given event, and 
how the body always carries these functors into the event via the 
very fact of its existence, and its potential for prompting move-
ments in others that can invoke resubjectifying affects.
13. For Guattari’s original chart that lays out the co-compositions 
between actual and real, and virtual and possible in the ontological 
quantrants, see page 28 of Schizoanalytic Cartographies (2013). 
14. Thus Apichatpong’s ecosophic aesthetic composition reflects what 
Brian Massumi has to say about how the entirety of the event 
always contains a nonsensuous component. “Even if the event’s 
conditioning elements and culmination are actual, the entirety 
of the event is virtual: doubly nonlocal, nonsensuously present, 
registering only in effect, and on all three counts really abstract” 
(Massumi 2011: 24). 
15. Some of these other films that use imagery similar to that found in 
Boonmee’s dream sequence include the various shorts that make 
up The Primitive Project (2009), such as A Letter to Uncle Boonmee 
(2009) and Phantoms of Nabua (2009).
16. Apichatpong explains the pertinence of his cinematic intervention 
into the contemporary Thai mediascape as follows: “The story of 
Nabua undeniably has echoes of the current political turmoil in 
Thailand. Institutions involved in those events of the past, along 
with new ones, are the key players in the ongoing chaos. Just as in 
the past, they manipulate the public psyche, instilling it with faith 
and fear” (Weerasethakul 2009a: 198). In the same piece he provides 
a further account of how he encountered the stories of Nabua’s 
military occupation while filming his Letter to Uncle Boonmee for the 
Primitive project.
17. Actual occasions are the “final real things of which the world is made 
up”, they are “drops of experience, complex and interdependent” 
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(Whitehead 1978: 27). Actual occasions emerge from process, and 
thus carry a selective function, for they never actualize all of the 
possibilities offered by the processual flow from one set of actual 
occasions to another. 
18. Whitehead might have even considered Uncle Boonmee a historical 
adventure film, given its activation of the past: “[A]dventures are 
to the adventurous […] a passive knowledge of the past loses the 
whole value of its message” (Whitehead 1967: 279).
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Apichatpong has long been one of Tsai Ming-Liang’s greatest 
admirers. Apart from the fact that they are both from Southeast 
Asia, the two filmmakers share a particular care for opacity that 
impregnates their cinematic gesture and suggests a common 
set of ethical and aesthetic concerns. The a-dramatic slowness 
that characterizes their cinema, as well as a multifaceted refusal 
of conventional narrative and drama questions our constituent 
relationship both with images and with the rapidly transforming 
spaces of global capitalism. These features contribute to the 
production a lasting impression of opacity. Following Aristotle’s 
paradigmatic definition, drama is indeed an elucidation of a 
situation, a way to make it intelligible. What matters for them is, 
following Tsai’s words, to “protect the obscurity of characters, 
relations and things”. How should we envisage this elastically 
conservative filmic gesture? What kind of conceptual tools and 
analytical approaches are required in order for the obscure and 
the vague, for the “mysterious objects at noon” populating their 
cinema not be explained away? In what ways does their cinema 
resist to simply signify, in order to propose complex visual and 
temporal enigmas? How does it nourish zones of non-knowledge 
and inoperativeness and enter in the composition of renewed 
ecosophic assemblages?
To say that Apichatpong’s cinema seeks to mystify us would 
be to misunderstand it. On the contrary, his cinema aims, 
right through the heart of the night, to let the world be, in all 
transparency. It is a cinema of trans-apparition. 
In this sense, I think one must consider his cinema as an 
invitation to live life as an initiation. But an initiation into what? 
Not so much into a doctrine on the processuality of the world 
or the non-discursive dimension of the event, but as something 
closer to life itself, a life that is living, imaginal, haptic and 
gently enchanted.
Érik Bordeleau
Percolating the Elusive:  
Into Apichatpong’s Dreamscape
The theory which I am urging admits a greater ultimate 
mystery and a deeper ignorance. The past and the 
future meet and mingle in the ill-defined present. The 
passage of nature which is only another name for 
the creative force of existence has no narrow ledge 
of definite instantaneous present within which to 
operate. Its operative presence which is now urging 
nature forward must be sought for throughout the 
whole, in the remotest past as well as in the narrowest 
breadth of any present duration. Perhaps also in the 
unrealised future. Perhaps also in the future which 
might be as well as the actual future which will be.
Alfred N. Whitehead (1920: 73)
Movies are a form of black magic. It’s instinctive.
Apichatpong Weerasethakul (Pansittivorakul 2006) 
A Natural Aesthetics of Mystery
All things somber and mysterious, fantastic and animated 
– such as the films of Apichatpong Weerasethakul – pose a 
particular problem for those who want to approach them by 
discursive means without mutilating them. One should of course 
not further obscure them, nor treat them in a mystifying or 
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“obscurantist” manner; but it is just as important to not elucidate 
them unduly, and instead develop modes of presentation for 
them that preserve their relative opacity, their own ways of 
moving and proposing occasions of encounter. An enticing 
analysis envelops as much as it explains that which moves us 
about these things; it beckons us towards experience, in the 
wide and at once rigorous sense that radical empiricists have 
given that notion. Developed to its full potential by William 
James, Alfred North Whitehead or John Dewey, the concept 
of experience – “nothing but experience, but nothing less 
than experience,” James would say – crosses the limits of 
consciousness or of subjectivity in order to reconfigure our 
relation to knowing and, perhaps even more so, to unknowing. 
That is how Whitehead can write without any intention to 
obfuscate that his concept of nature “admits a greater ultimate 
mystery and a deeper ignorance” and defines philosophy as 
a mystical activity that, in the name of a constant renewal 
of thought and society, explores the unsayable without ever 
renouncing the requirements of rationality (1968: 73).1 For John 
Dewey, philosophy must similarly be wary of the simplicity of 
the clear and distinct which suits the categorical understanding 
so well. In a movement of thought that prefigures and justifies 
the spontaneously transdisciplinary and joyously undisciplined 
trajectories that characterize the practice of research-creation, 
Dewey invites us to refrain from hastily dismissing the vague 
and dark elements that fill experience and to be attentive to the 
potentials they comprise.2
I would like to address the cinema of Apichatpong and more 
specifically his Primitive project in this “naturalist” mindset. In 
dialogue with his films and the fascinating and elusive images 
that populate his cinema, these philosophical considerations 
on the empiricist and speculative conception of experience and 
its relation to the passage of nature as a creative force suggest 
something like a natural aesthetic of mystery or, by extension, 
a mystic nature of the aesthetic. How can one avoid explaining 
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away in the name of legibility the vague and distinct-obscure that 
persists in all of our aesthetic experiences? How to account for 
that unknown element in them which interpellates and draws 
us in, often without our knowing why? Perhaps it has to do with 
their allure, the more or less virtual movement that adorns 
certain things or people with an unprecedented propositional 
power. For the word “allure” points toward the singular manner 
that courses through a being and characterizes it: a sort of 
evanescent signature – a style – charged with a force of affective 
propulsion that invites further folds and relays. But conversely, 
the word also reveals an interplay of capture and enthrallment, 
how the captivating allure acts as a lure for feeling. This idea 
of a propositional efficacy that stands in direct relation to the 
sensible is at the heart of Whitehead’s philosophy. It concerns 
the way in which a proposition, aesthetic or otherwise, acts as 
an attractor for new feelings and as a vector for new becomings. 
Indeed, for Whitehead, any propositional feeling is an occasion 
for the modification of experience, for a bifurcation that could 
potentially create an event or be taken up again later. As Isabelle 
Stengers writes in her monumental Thinking with Whitehead, “the 
entertainment [of propositions] lures us into feeling, thinking, 
speaking, in short, becomes, in the most various ways, an 
Fig. 30: Still from Uncle Boonmee.
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ingredient of the experiences that will follow it” (2011a: 418). 
Stengers takes great care to specify that the proposition itself 
does not explain the “entertainment” through which it comes 
into existence. That is the reason why there is mystery and 
excess, “deeper ignorance” and encounter, with all the openness, 
contingency and indetermination this implies. 
Like the term agencement, which suggests at the same time the 
elegance of what is well assembled and the underlying work of 
arranging heterogeneous elements, the word “allure” evokes at 
once what may be called the super-natural ease of a successful 
envelopment and, beneath the surface, the fine material 
constellation that the interplay of captures establishes, through 
which becomings effectively pass. Exploring the propositional 
efficacy of Apichatpong’s soulful filmic gesture, I wish to focus 
more specifically on the importance he confers to the notion of 
the dream in his cinematic practice and its ethopoietic effects. 
A Fantasy that Wants Nothing More Than to Make Night Fall 
into the Day
Despite your efforts to avoid having to evoke light in 
speaking of the obscure…
Maurice Blanchot (1993: 31)
Apichatpong says that cinema is a form of black magic, that 
it is essentially instinctive. Indeed, his cinema operates and 
submerges us in the “subtle element”: he develops a manner all 
his own to make reality appear and disappear, to refine the real 
by means of cinema’s specific propensity towards the oneiric. 
Apichatpong’s cinema puts things into a mode of suspension: it 
brims with virtual and fleeting states, transitory twilight worlds 
where the living and the dead meet, and even moments of carnal 
grace (think of the sublime insouciance of Blissfully Yours and the 
languor of Mekong Hotel). He seems entirely devoted to making 
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us experience the imperceptible meanderings of time’s passage, 
the unstable and indefinite nature of the present.
Apichatpong’s cinema seems like a marvelous response to 
Blanchot’s subtle interrogation: how to discover the obscure 
without uncovering it? Few are the filmmakers who understand 
so well how to film both the jungle and the night, asking us in 
the gentlest of ways to give ourselves over to them so that they 
may eventually pass through us. An active mediation of the 
obscure-to-be-lived; mysterious passivity of a lived immediacy. 
The tropical mist – or cloud – of unknowing3 that engulfs all of 
Apichatpong’s films invites contemplation in the creative sense 
that Deleuze and Guattari have given the term: “Contemplating 
is creating, the mystery of passive creation, sensation. Sensation 
fills out the plane of composition and is filled with itself by 
filling itself with what it contemplates: it is ‘enjoyment’ and ‘self- 
enjoyment’” (1994: 212).4 This mystery of passive creation is an 
essential ingredient of any active relation to the future or, more 
precisely, to futurity. In a comment on this crucial passage of 
What is Philosophy?, Giorgio Agamben emphasizes the necessity 
to conceive obscurity not simply as an absence or removal of 
light but as something that one must be able to produce and 
articulate – a wander line or, as mystics refer to it, a “night of 
the soul”.5 
Tilda Swinton describes with moving sharpness the transparent 
and unassuming mystery that pervades the films of Apichatpong, 
the call to (impersonally) experience the night as forest and the 
forest as night. What is at stake for the famous actress is cinema 
considered as vector for a life initiated to the refined charms of 
involuntarism: 
I wish I could show my children these films, although I 
know we won’t for some years. I feel they would settle 
them, give them a divining rod for the future, when 
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the light might trick them into thinking editing is the 
answer to a sense of real power in life. 
But I am patient. It’s bigger children that need 
these archeological remnants of sentient – cohesive – 
possibilities, of post-choice harmony, these reminders 
of the natural order of gesture, of faith, of acceptance. 
[…] The forest binds the soul and holds it, safe and 
wild, in his cinema. I am deeply besotted with that 
particular wilderness. (Cousins and Swinton 2009: 11, 
emphasis added)
This quotation offers a number of leads towards the threshold 
of the future anterior and of ethopoietics to which I will 
return in the last section of this essay. Suffice it to say for 
now that Swinton gracefully links present, future and past in 
an archaeological gesture carried by a harmony that resorbs, 
at least partially, the excesses of voluntarism that modern 
Enlightenment has encouraged. This is about an art of immanent 
attention that knows how to resist causal narratives that simply 
make the present follow on from the past, a resistance that 
allows events to come from their virtual beginnings: a future 
that is always already implicated and whose effects one must 
anticipate, not unlike a diviner. The real is immanently recharged 
with the fantastic on this subtle and necessarily elusive 
threshold, this wild, nocturnal fringe through which spirits – 
and not only those that pass through the films of Apichatpong 
– are always to come, always coming about. As discrete but 
nonetheless insisting events, they effectively complicate our 
relation to time; they mark a territory and call upon the multiple. 
The nocturnal and forestial effect of Apichatpong’s cinema 
resides in this patient and attentive disposition of spirits. 
“Perhaps cinema is never as fantastic as when the ghost, before 
materializing in a body, can already be felt, when the invisible is 
hardly perceptible” (Leutrat 1995: 59). In Apichatpong’s cinema, 
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the invisible gathers in secret; spectres come and go, without 
tragedy or terror. They participate in a “subtle fantastic, one that 
has no regard for supernatural manifestations and turns the 
real, the ordinary, the everyday into an apparition, an epiphany, 
a ghost, indeed, into a shrouded cadaver” (Leutrat 199: 101). If 
Apichatpong assigns such a determining role to the night – the 
time of metamorphoses and transformations par excellence – 
he also takes great care to remind us that ghosts only appear 
under conditions of liminality, specifically “at the break of dawn 
and twilight” (Weerasethakul 2009: 192). Apichatpong’s films 
are recognizable for being both initiatory and fundamentally 
a-dramatic, for the modest way in which they make night fall into 
the day in order to activate the minimal, liminal and potentially 
magical threshold of cinema.
The Primitive Project
The power of dreaming is a divine and mysterious 
power. It is through dreaming that man communicates 
with the dark dream by which he is surrounded.
Charles Baudelaire (1971: 148)
Fig. 31: Construction of the spaceship.
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Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives is part of a larger 
project called Primitive that includes an installation of the same 
title, two short films – A Letter to Uncle Boonmee and Phantoms of 
Nabua – as well as an artist book. The project, which addresses 
questions of extinction and memory, is set in the northeast of 
Thailand, a region that has experienced a strong anti-communist 
repression. In an interview with James Quandt, Apichatpong 
confides that it was none other than Benedict Anderson who 
persuaded him to travel through Thailand’s northeast to explore 
the tormented history of his home region.
From the 1950s to the early ‘80s, communists coming from 
Vietnam and Laos settled in this part of the country. In the ‘60s, 
Nabua had effectively become a “red zone” and, with American 
support, the Thai government gradually intensified its operations 
against a local population considered too sympathetic towards 
the interests of the enemy. The repression was brutal and many 
peasants had to flee into the jungle to escape the atrocities. Uncle 
Boonmee refers directly to these acts of violence. For instance, 
Boonmee himself says that the disease from which he suffers is 
a result of his bad karma, of having killed too many communists. 
The Primitive project is also grounded in Apichatpong’s concern 
Fig. 32: Spaceship flying at the break of dawn and twilight.
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for the political troubles that have recently shaken Thailand. He 
has repeatedly expressed his rather pessimistic vision for the 
future of his country and been increasingly involved in the fight 
against film censorship. And yet, he has often pointed out that he 
does not consider himself particularly politicized and that cinema 
is for him first and foremost a means of personal expression.
In light of this, the Primitive project can be legitimately seen 
as a poetic and cinematographic attempt at documenting and 
archiving the memory of a tormented past that is in danger 
of disappearing entirely. But such a reading would fail to 
properly grasp what is really at stake in this oeuvre. For, instead 
of collecting the memories of people who have lived these 
traumatic events themselves, Apichatpong has decided to focus 
his attention on the life of the teenagers who live in the village of 
Nabua. He says:
Everywhere we went there were stories. Helicopter 
shot down here, friends shot there, beheadings 
happened bere. Gradually, just standing in this quiet 
land became an intense experience for me. Perhaps 
too intense, for I doubted I was in the right place. […] 
For me, the presence of the teens had made Nabua’s 
air breathable. Soon Primitive became a portrait 
of the teenage male descendants of the farmer 
communists, freed from the widow ghost’s empire. 
(Weerasethakul 2009: 198)
Curiously, one of the principal elements of the project consists 
in constructing a spaceship in collaboration with the teenage 
villagers. Apichatpong has been fascinated by science-fiction 
for a long time. “I always dreamed of making a movie with a 
spaceship. When could there be a better time to do so than 
now in Thailand? And somehow Nabua is a perfect place for 
this vehicle to land and to introduce the idea of a journey” 
(Weerasethakul 2009: 200). The spaceship incarnates dimensions 
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of the fantastic and futurity that effectively complicate a more 
conventional relation to the past than we would expect from 
an artwork that is interested in suppressed memories. Much 
like the fresh and youthful air that Apichatpong appreciates 
in Nabua’s adolescents, the spaceship brings fresh air and 
allows for a liberating relation with history. As Karen Newman 
suggests, his spaceships “give us time and space to re-dream 
the past and ask what can be learned to create a better future 
for the next generation” (Newman 2009: 152). It is this dreamed 
relation between the past, the present and the future – the 
transformative and transductive dreamscape in which his 
project unfolds – that is crucial to Apichatpong’s work and is 
what I would like to explore further. Is the dream not a vague 
and mysterious operator capable of inducing new becomings? 
Is it not the essential component of a speculative filmic gesture 
towards new possibilities of existence?
Cinema as an Extension of the Soul
… an art is never just an art; at the same time it is 
always a suggested world.
Jacques Rancière (2014: 38)
Several filmmakers have described the great proximity between 
cinema and the oneiric dimension of existence. Pasolini for 
example has spoken of cinema’s power to embody dreams. 
But to my knowledge, even if Abbas Kiorastami welcomes the 
fact that people fall asleep during the projection of his films, 
nobody (besides perhaps David Lynch?) has gone as far as 
Apichatpong in exploring the oneiric dimension of cinema. One 
can affirm without too much risk that, together with the ghost, 
the dream is the principal notion that describes Apichatpong’s 
cinematographic project and around which his poetic relation 
to history and the entangled dimensions of time are articulated. 
Discussing the Primitive project, he affirms:
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The teenagers provided me with the future of the 
place. When I went there, it was very much like a 
performance: you don’t know what to do. You just go 
there and work with them to create dreams. In dreams 
you can’t take control. So it’s like a collaborative dream-
making. (Kim 2011: 50, emphasis added)
Here, the dream appears as an elusive space that escapes 
voluntary control and in which everyone’s existence and 
desires potentially attune to each other’s. To dream, then, 
is to reach a point where reality ceases to be a principle, to 
enter a space in which it becomes possible to elaborate and 
resonate in collective harmonies as yet unknown. Those 
who follow the open trajectories of a dream surely open 
themselves to new possibilities, but they also run the risk of a 
fundamental questioning, if not a radical derealization. Perhaps 
we are protecting ourselves against just this possibility, as 
the anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has poignantly 
suggested in his critique of speculative realism’s negative 
anthropocentrism. Quoting his friend during the Cerisy 
conference on Speculative Gesture (2013), the shaman Ravi 
Kopenauer, he says, “White people sleep a lot but only dream 
about themselves”. And perhaps it is better this way or, 
differently put, perhaps it is a welcome protective measure 
because, following Deleuze, the dream is a site for terrible 
predations. It is better to dream of oneself than not to dream 
at all, he seems to tell us in his talk “What is the Creative Act?” 
from 1987, to the extent that it protects us against the dreams 
of others. For “as soon as someone else dreams, there is 
danger. People’s dreams are always all-consuming and threaten 
to devour us” (Deleuze 2006: 318). In short, then, what the 
dream puts at stake is the becoming of our soul itself. We have 
been warned.
There is indeed no veritable dream that isn’t also shaped by 
the danger of losing one’s foothold. And this is precisely the 
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condition sine qua non for an existential transformation, the price 
at which the fragile and hazardous possibility of being initiated 
into the dreams of others takes form. In the last pages of Thinking 
with Whitehead, Isabelle Stengers evokes these interstices in 
which all our dreams meet anonymously, far from any regulated 
representations and watchwords:
only dreamers can accept the modification of 
their dream. […] And if the exchange is possible, if 
sometimes – an essentially anonymous event – one 
dream may induce the modification of another or 
evoke another, it is insofar as their point of junction 
is always a tangent point: neither a frontal clash 
between rival powers nor being swallowed up in the 
other’s dream, not confusion in a banal dream of 
power but a local resonance, designating past tenses 
of divergent accomplishments and future tenses 
responding to distinct tests. (Stengers 2011: 516–8)
This opens up a number of avenues for thought. I am interested 
first of all in the way in which the dream appears as the site for a 
differential gathering in which dissimilar elements come together 
and find the possibility for a new assemblage. The local entering 
into resonance of which Stengers speaks is a communication 
between heterogeneous elements; and one easily perceives in 
the quoted passage how important it is to her that none of the 
elements that the dreams put into variation ever enter a simple 
process of collective fusion. This properly cosmopolitical concern 
corresponds to “the problematic co-presence of practices […]: 
the experience, always in the present, of the one into whom 
the other’s dreams, doubts, hopes, and fears pass” (Stengers 
2011a: 372).
The dream as defined by Stengers constitutes a determining 
component of any assemblage charged with metamorphic 
potential. It offers the – literal and not at all metaphoric 
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– possibility of a composition among beings and that which in 
them, more or less voluntarily, on the distinct-obscure threshold 
of their desires, offers itself up to the encounter. But how does 
Apichatpong’s dream and those of Nabua’s teenagers pass 
into us? Through cinema, of course, the art of which Deleuze 
and Guattari rightly said has a particular aptitude to capture 
the birth of deliriums and the burgeoning of events “precisely 
because it is not analytical and regressive, but explores a global 
field of coexistence” (1983: 274). Apichatpong’s precious remark 
concerning the relation between dream and cinema must be 
understood along these lines, with all the required technical 
considerations:
[Thus cinema can be a phantom in this sense]: 
because it’s something that you really need to dream. 
Cinema is a vehicle we produce for ourselves and 
as part of us. It’s like an extension of our soul that 
manifests itself. (Kim 2011: 52)
This assertion confirms the general impression one gathers from 
Apichatpong’s films, namely that in his films dream and cinema 
are actively thrown into a relation of reciprocal indetermination. 
Fig. 33: Still from Cemetery of Splendour.
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This explains, if only in part, the contagious potential of his 
cinema, its unique ability to profoundly modify the entirety of 
our perceptions. It is through dreaming the medium of cinema 
and making it reach [unprecedented degrees of defocalisation6 
that Apichatpong manages to operate directly on the subtle 
element], creating atmospheres that affect our understanding 
of the distinction between the real and the imaginary as well as 
coax our relation to the visible and the invisible along new and 
unexpected directions. 
We are now able to problematize in more detail the tense 
relationhip between dreaming and the suffocating effect of the 
positivity of history, as described by Apichatpong with regard to 
his choice of working mainly with the teenagers of Nabua. This 
relation is particularly complex in Apichatpong’s cinema to the 
extent that it implies, as with any great filmmaker, a reflection 
on cinema as a technical medium as well as a profoundly 
existential dimension that effectively concerns our soul. Or rather: 
in Apichatpong, the reflection on the medium is practically 
speaking indiscernible from the spiritual considerations that 
never fail to astound and which some of our critical habits 
would rather leave aside. At exactly this point, the tradition 
of speculative pragmatism, with its expanded conception of 
experience, is of great help. What does Apichatpong mean to 
say when he affirms that cinema is “a part of us” and that it is 
“an extension of our soul that manifests itself”? One might think 
at first glance that he simply wants to say that cinema is for us 
a way of expressing ourselves. But express what exactly? Our 
“interiority”? Our “emotions”? Our “soul”? Via a detour through 
Buddhism, Apichatpong’s cinematographic practice reveals 
itself to be as immanentist as possible, rejoining the Deleuzian 
idea according to which “the brain is the screen” (Deleuze 2006: 
282). Indeed, Apichatpong is particularly fond of the following 
anecdote that James Quandt has chosen to place on the inside 
cover of the book on Apichatpong that he edited:
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A monk recently told me that meditation was like 
filmmaking. He said when one meditates, one doesn’t 
need film. As if film was an excess. In a way he is right. 
Our brain is the best camera and projector. If only we can 
find a way to operate it properly. (Quandt 2009: 184, 
emphasis added)7
When Deleuze pronounced his by now famous statement – 
“the brain is the screen” – he had in mind the developments 
in molecular biology which he opposed to the linguistic and 
psychoanalytical models of film analysis. Eager to establish 
a continuum between the spectator’s brain and the cinema 
screen, he meant to foreground the way in which moving images 
trace and retrace, immediately so to speak, our brain circuits.8 
In a curious reversal, the image of thought that Apichatpong 
proposes also indirectly echoes recent developments in 
neuroscience, which is interested in solving the mystery of 
the beneficial effects that meditative practices have on the 
functioning of the brain. Incidentally, Apichatpong says he has 
always been interested in the activity of the human mind and 
that he is working on a film in which the characters fall prey to a 
sleeping sickness.9 This will serve as an occasion to explore the 
influence of daylight on memory and dreams.
But at first glance nothing indicates that this remark of 
Apichatpong’s is in the least compatible with the cuts and 
connections of Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic animism10 
or even with a more conventional exploration of the relation 
between cinema and the cognitive sciences. On the contrary, its 
spiritualizing tenor suggests that cinema as media technology 
is simply superfluous. If only we were able to plunge deep 
enough into ourselves, if only our relation to the world wasn’t 
so distorted and alienated, we wouldn’t need any memorial 
support or external projection organ – in short, we could 
dispense with the cinematic apparatus. This is, in essence, what 
the Buddhist monk seems to say and to which Apichatpong 
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seems to acquiesce: we humans are admittedly prosthetic 
beings but this could surely be otherwise, provided that we find 
the path towards an integral use of our spiritual faculties. This 
apparently conservative, even reactionary attitude towards 
media technologies is only reinforced by Apichatpong’s mixed 
feelings with regard to the relation between Buddhism and 
cinema. Indeed, right before the above-cited interview passage, 
he confides: “I have this conflicting feeling because sometimes 
I think filmmaking contradicts Buddhism. It is not about looking 
into yourself, but about making an illusion of that process” 
(Quandt 2009: 184). But if we can resist ever so slightly our bad 
academic habits of sending Apichatpong’s scruples to the pillory 
of critical posthuman transformism, perhaps a new perspective 
will reveal itself that is able to enrich our various ecologies of 
practices, including the spiritual and the media-technological. For 
this purpose, one must be willing to take Apichatpong’s concerns 
seriously. And what exactly does he say? That the cinema as 
an artistic practice which approaches introspection can harm 
the soul, for the soul is defined by the risk of its loss. It can be 
torn, dispersed, reduced, forgotten. It can also be saved. The 
soul and its incessant refocusing. To have a soul is to confront 
the improbable challenge of envisioning new possibilities to 
populate the present and to make life habitable. The soul, as 
it is understood here, has nothing substantial – if by that it is 
meant that it contains a stable and immutable core which is 
capable of holding itself and returning (I will shortly come back 
to the specific consistency of the movement of return). The soul 
is essential in the dynamic and monadological sense of the term 
in that it designates a minimum of belonging, a threshold of 
locality, a differential vulnerability – the expressive interiority of 
a fold.11 In the vocabulary of speculative pragmatism, the “[s]oul 
is a mode of functioning that occasionally happens, not the 
ultimate truth of our experience” (Stengers 2005: 53–4).12 In other 
words and as Whitehead has pointed out with his usual sobriety 
and rigor, we become souls – in this regard, there is no doubt 
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that Apichatpong’s cinematographic propositions contribute 
to this becoming in a utterly fantastic and unprecedented way. 
From this perspective, the soul testifies to the fact that we are 
(becoming) capable of entertaining possibilities as such, with 
all their corollary doubts, hopes, excitations and hesitations. It 
is proof that we find ourselves in a position to encounter and 
entertain propositions as so many abstractions to be lived, 
as so many lived abstractions: “The soul is not defined by its 
limitations, but rather by what I’d call ‘leaps of the imagination’; 
not community of intuition or appropriation, but becomings 
triggered by something that cannot explain them, by the 
proliferation experienced as such of these existants that are 
propositions” (Stengers 2011b: 442).13 Thus, following speculative 
pragmatism, to take care of oneself and of one’s soul is first of 
all to care for one’s modes of abstraction. Cinema is as much 
a mode of abstraction as meditation.14 And one can approach 
either one from their mystical aspect if only one accepts that the 
mystical is always already a matter of techniques of existence 
with their very own possibilities for affective fullness and 
attunement. Incidentally, Peirce seems to suggest something 
of this order when he affirms that “[t]he greatest point of art 
consists in the introduction of suitable abstractions” (quoted in 
Massumi 2011: 15).
It seems to me that it is only within this expanded conceptual 
frame, which integrates technical and spiritual considerations, 
that we can do justice to the propositional efficacy contained 
in the spiritual vision that Apichatpong proposes through the 
anecdote of the Buddhist monk. His filmic gesture is ultimately 
a matter of returning into history/in time – the specific and 
even paradoxical challenge, falling to all of us, of conceiving this 
retrospective and, at least seemingly, nostalgic movement as a 
particular mode of abstraction. In other words, it is a matter of 
providing oneself with the means for a technical and speculative 
treatment of the question of returning, both ethopoietically 
(going back as the essential “sedentary” component of a 
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becoming-soul and a self-caring refrain) and cinematographically 
(cinema as a time machine). For, as the name already indicates, at 
the heart of the Primitive project is the expression of a desire to 
return cinema to its origins, “before the image moved, before it 
became the moving image”; what discloses itself there and then, 
Apichatpong tells us, is “a kind of unraveling of the apparatus to 
a time before technology mediated how people remember and 
relate to the past” (Carrion-Murayari and Gioni 2011: 26).
So if Apichatpong highly values the image of a brain that is at 
the same time screen and projector, it is because this image 
nurtures the possibility, realized within the Primitive project (if 
only by way of the diversity of media employed), of de-creating 
cinema in order to reconnect with a time before moving images. 
The promise of spiritual plenitude resulting from the optimal use 
of our mental faculties that the Buddhist thought-image lets us 
glimpse creates space for a reflection on the cinematographic 
medium and its complex and entangled relation to time. It acts 
as a lure for feeling that induces a disjunctive dreaming which 
corresponds, not unlike a dark precursor of intimacy, to the 
delicate disposition of spirits that Apichatpong orchestrates 
in his cinema.
Apichatpong’s cinema is about the fabrication of souls and 
spiritual conducts. The slow and powerful gesture of return 
that he establishes in the flow of moving images all the way to 
the historical threshold of the stilled frame, and the enigmatic 
doublings that proliferate at various moments of his cinema, 
constitute as many procedures for multiplying oneiric vortices 
and other abodes for the soul. It is from exactly this point 
of view, that of a machinic animism that is equally attached 
to the specificity of its medium and the possibility to dream 
this medium, that Apichatpong confronts the technological 
transformations that affect his practice, at a healthy distance 
from the foolishness of critical technophilia as well as any 
concealed nostalgia.
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Cinema is a vehicle we produce for ourselves and 
as part of us. It’s like an extension of our soul that 
manifests itself. Concerning new technology, the soul 
is changing and I don’t think it’s naturally good or bad 
way. It’s just changing and we need to pay attention 
to how it influences cinema. I don’t make a strict 
judgment of what’s going to die in cinema. I wanted 
to express my longing for the old Thai cinema in 
Uncle Boonmee, but my aim was less to revive the old 
cinema itself, than invite the audience to realize what 
was there before. (Kim 2011:52)
The Archeological Gesture as a Use of  
Going Back and Forth
BUT the Future is only dark from the outside. Leap into 
it – and it EXPLODES with Light.
Mina Loy (1996: 149)
Returning is being but only the being of becoming.
Deleuze (1994: 41)15 
In the previously quoted excerpt from her letter to Mark Cousin, 
Tilda Swinton evokes through her inspired prose the ethopoietic 
effects of the wild obscurity that envelops Apichatpong’s cinema. 
His films preserve within their depths a reserve of night to be 
“discovered without being uncovered”, archeological and virtual 
sheets of time to be approached with the circumspection of 
the diviner, as zones of unknowing that carry new sentient 
possibilities so that we may resist the temptation of life editing 
and the overly clear cuts of the will. It’s as if, to speak with Giorgio 
Agamben, “this invisible light that is the darkness of the present”, 
the very same that emanates from the films of Apichatpong, 
“cast its shadow on the past, so that the past, touched by this 
shadow, acquired the ability to respond to the darkness of 
the now” (2009a: 53). Thus, the cinema of Apichatpong would 
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possess the remarkable power to transform into seers those 
who are disposed to be interpellated by its transparent mystery, 
to make them more attentive to the thin spiritual veneer that 
laces their gestures and to the share of the unlived that persists 
in them; in short, to make them, in as gentle a way as possible, 
contemporaries. “And to be contemporary means in this sense to 
return to a present where we have never been” (Agamben 2009a: 
51–2). But is this even possible?
By way of conclusion, I would like to take up once more the 
question of the dream as return and path to self-enjoyment by 
engaging one of the very first publications of Michel Foucault, 
namely the introduction to the French translation of Dream 
and Existence by the phenomenological psychiatrist Ludwig 
Binswanger. This text, published in 1954 and revisited by 
Agamben in the context of his reflection on the archeological 
gesture in The Signature of All Things, is dense and complex. It 
discusses anthropology’s relation to the image and signification, 
and proposes a critical step beyond phenomenology that already 
anticipates the subsequent development of Foucault’s work. 
One of the passages that is crucial for my interpretation of 
Fig. 34: Still from Phantoms of Nabua.
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Apichatpong’s filmic dreamscape and the creative tension that it 
establishes with the positive element of history, reads as follows:
All imagination, to be authentic, must once more learn 
to dream, and “ars poetica” has no meaning unless 
it teaches us to break with the fascination of images 
and to reopen, for imagination, its path of freedom 
toward the dream that offers it, as its absolute truth, 
the “irrefragable kernel of night.” […] Purified in the 
fire of the dream, […] The image is no longer image 
of something, totally projected toward an absence 
which it replaces; rather, it is gathered into itself 
and is given as the fullness of a presence; it doesn’t 
denote something anymore, it is addressed to someone. 
[…] Not that the dream is the truth of history. But in 
bringing forth that which in Existence is most irreducible 
to history, the dream shows best the meaning it can 
take […]. (Foucault 1984–85: 73–44, emphasis added; 
slightly modified)
The dream as Foucault describes it participates in the emergence 
of a freedom for the end of a world. The present is addressed by 
it. This foregrounds the speculative and propositional presence 
of the dream which, in its radical inactuality, calls forth a 
becoming towards an as yet unnamed hour. For “purified in the 
fire of the dream,” as Foucault tells us, the image no longer acts 
as a simple designation or recall: it becomes itself the occasion 
for a fulfillment. As fire takes hold of a being, the dream sweeps 
up the composition of residual images as a form of life to extract 
from it a new incandescence, a new possibility of existence. How 
could one not, in this context, think of the magnificent short film 
Phantoms of Nabua? It shows a screen in the night onto which 
lightning is projected. In the twilight of the screen, the teenagers 
of Nabua gradually appear, playing soccer with a burning 
football. Every time it is hit, the flying ball produces a powerful 
hypnotic rustle. The screen eventually lights up in flames, thus 
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laying bare the ghostly light of the projector in the night and a 
spectator distraught by so much radiance and intensity. 
The dream as a “de-actualized peak of the present” interpolates 
the course of history and releases an unprecedented 
contemporaneity (Deleuze 1989: 130). It presents itself as the 
transindividual space and jouissance of a more-to-live – the effect 
of an affective propulsion that inheres to the oneiric plenitude 
in all its incandescent futurity. In the way it addresses the 
liveliness that coasts through us, then, the dream is a “natural” 
creative force and in this sense it is “irreducible to history”. But 
this address is nothing less than paradoxical to the extent that 
it is most often indirect, elusive, and even impersonal. As if the 
proper content of the dream or the reverie, its “irrefragable 
kernel of night” as René Char has it, must remain anonymous, 
impenetrable, and never become a matter of concern, must 
never concern us. As if the dream – Apichatpong’s, in this case – 
could just as well not take hold of us and move us, and not only 
because it can only reach us by way of the uncertain grace of its 
cinematographic articulation. The archeological gesture indicates 
the essentially precarious quality of the dream as element of an 
art of existence.
Uncle Boonmee Who Can Recall His Past Lives tells the story of 
man afflicted with a kidney disease and whose end is nearing. 
His imminent death invokes numerous ghosts and spirits that 
emerge one after the other, as if their presence made palpable 
the threshold between the living and the dead. With softness 
and simplicity, the film induces a sense of floatation and reverie, 
as we drift from one previous life to the next as so many unlived 
pasts or potential lives of which it matters little in the end to 
whom they must be attributed. Through this remarkable effect 
of an a-subjective decentering, the limit between human and 
animal or the individual and its environment is naturally erased, 
following the principle of a “transmigration of souls between 
humans, plants, animals, and ghosts,” as Apichatpong points 
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out in the director’s statement that accompanies Primitive. 
In this eminently porous, fluid and marvelously ecosophical 
world, modes of address multiply and entangle, they compose 
a fantastic and lush pluriverse in which each element, real or 
imaginary, constitutes a new perspective; a superior plane of the 
transindividual on which evolve those beings who, as Frédéric 
Neyrat formulates in a beautiful reflection on the fantastic and 
the “constitution of our outsides”, “have passed from the world’s 
tearing apart to the life cinematographic” (Neyrat 2013). 
At the moment of his death, Uncle Boonmee and his family 
withdraw into a cave. He is caught in a strange vision: a dystopian 
world to come in which some kind of authority has the power to 
make “people from the past” disappear by shining a light at them. 
As this vision is narrated in a voice-over, a series of immobile 
images interpolate the course of the film. They are troubling 
and rather low-fi photographs that show a group of teenagers 
dressed in military uniforms and proudly posing with a ghost 
they have just caught (which, as in the rest of the film, takes 
the form of a gorilla). One can recognize them as the illustrious 
adolescents of Nabua although viewers who do not know the 
rest of the Primitive project would not know. Boonmee explains 
in voice-over that “[t]he light projected images from their past 
onto a screen until their arrival in the future. Once these images 
appeared, these ‘past people’ disappeared”.
How is this rather mysterious allegory of a disappearance by 
means of photographic or cinematographic projection to be 
understood? Does cinema not, to the contrary, have the capacity 
to conserve better than any other art the traces and presence 
of the past? Apichatpong provides us with an important clue 
for solving this riddle when he points out that this sequence of 
the film unfolds from the perspective of a future of the past or, 
differently put, from a future anterior. This indicates once more 
the convergence of his reflection on the filmic medium and his 
remarkable conception of the dream, as well as their mutual 
Percolating The Elusive 103
impact on our ways of relating to the history of the present and 
to times past. Interviewed about this sequence, he says:
For me, it’s the place where Uncle Boonmee and I 
merge, because what he’s talking about is my dream. 
[…] it’s about the future, but at the same time it has 
connotations of the present. In a way, we live in a 
totalitarian regime in Thailand, so I wanted to refer 
to this moment where the maker and the character 
merge. And when Uncle Boonmee goes back to the 
womb in the cave I wanted to take the movie back to 
its origins, before the image moved, before it became 
the moving image. […] There is a reference to the 
future, which is what Chris Marker talks about, but 
it’s the future of the past. It’s the representation of 
the future but from the past perspective. I’m very 
interested in these kinds of time shifts. (Sélavy 2010; 
emphasis added)
This problematization of the present through the “future of 
the past” corresponds point by point to Agamben’s conception 
of the archeological gesture. The latter does not consist in the 
uncovering of factual truths of the past that one would only 
need to bring to the attention of the present; nor is it about 
unearthing buried memories for the sake of exposing them to 
the light of actuality – the allegory staged by Apichatpong shows 
with sufficient eloquence that this process of “illumination” or 
of a straightforward elucidation is inefficient, if not destructive. 
The archeological gesture does not aspire to a restoration of the 
historical moment because the arche that it aims at can never 
be fully identified with a specific moment in a chronological 
past. The arche in question does not represent a datum or 
a chronologically dated substance but rather a tension that 
traverses the element of history and that persists imperceptibly 
across the circumstances and modalities that have constituted 
it as an origin. In this sense, the archeological gesture, as it is 
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defined by Agamben in The Signature of All Things, is the only 
access to the present: “Archaeology moves backward through 
the course of history […] toward the point where history (whether 
individual or collective) becomes accessible for the first time, 
in accordance with the temporality of the future anterior” 
(2009b: 107).
This definition of the archeological gesture is consistent with 
Apichatpong’s mysterious and poetic approach towards 
the violent repression of the historic memory of Thailand’s 
northeast. For a series of questions traverse the entirety of 
the Primitive project: How to be contemporary to the villagers 
of Nabua and their numerous ghosts? How to share their 
dreams? How to film them? The co-presence with one’s own 
present is not self-evident. It is rare and difficult, Agamben 
tells us, because it implies the constitution of an active relation 
with a part of the unlived that directly insists in the present. 
It is at this point that Apichatpong’s aerial sensibility and his 
vivid conception of the dream come to play a decisive role 
in elaborating the archeological gesture that animates the 
Primitive project. For to summon ghosts without making them 
flee, to enter into resonance with the complex and entangled 
temporalities that co-exist in the present, the filmic archeological 
gesture has to percolate the elusive. The regression towards the 
past that he initiates aims not so much at restoring a traumatic 
primordial scene as letting past events modulate into new 
contemporaneities. An entire project of summoning that requires 
an art of tact, listening and allusion in order to bring to the 
surface not a distant past but something that could not be lived 
in another present. As Nabokov once wrote in Transparent Things: 
“A thin veneer of immediate reality is spread over natural and 
artificial matter, and whoever wishes to remain in the now, with 
the now, on the now, should please not break its tension film” 
(1989: 2). The archeological potential of the filmic dream courses 
through and rises up to precisely this thin veneer which envelops 
events lived, unlived and to be lived.
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The movement of the dream that insists at the heart of the 
archeological gesture is not exhausted in the restoration of 
a historical positivity: it goes far beyond it, and below, taking 
up again “the first moment of freedom” until it coincides 
with the creative force of nature’s passage that traverses the 
free “trajectory of existence itself” (Foucault 1984–85: 58, 
60). Following such a trajectory implies the risk of a radical 
“derealization” as was suggested earlier. This derealization or 
decreation is something that we all experience to some degree in 
the face of Apichatpong’s cinema. If Derrida was able to say that 
we need to learn to live with ghosts if we want to finally learn 
how to live, we can say that with Apichatpong, and his unique 
poetic manner of taking us to the heart of the Thai jungle and its 
war memories, we will learn to summon the ghosts of the past 
only to the same extent that we learn how to dream them. Part 
of the transparent and oneiric mystery of Apichatpong’s cinema 
resides in the free movement of the dream and the way it has of 
tying itself to the future of the past.
In his recent seminars, Agamben likes to evoke the astonishing 
richness of the expression “to use” (chresthai) in ancient Greek. 
He particularly appreciates, it seems, the expression “to use (the) 
return”, which in fact means “nostalgia”. In the same vein, and 
at the margin of the archeological gesture, wouldn’t “the use of 
going back and forth” be an appropriate way to evoke the blissful 
ambivalence of traveling through time – whether on board the 
spaceship of Nabua or not?
Notes
1. “The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of funda-
mental ideas illuminating the social system. It reverses the slow 
descent of accepted thought towards the inactive commonplace. If 
you like to phrase it so, philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct 
insight into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is 
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to rationalize mysticism: not by explaining it away, but by the intro-
duction of novel verbal characterizations, rationally coordinated” 
(Whitehead 1968: 174, emphasis added).
2. “What is really ‘in’ experience extends much further than that which 
at any time is known. From the standpoint of knowledge, objects 
must be distinct; their traits must be explicit; the vague and unre-
vealed is a limitation. Hence whenever the habit of identifying reality 
with the object of knowledge as such prevails, the obscure and vague 
are explained away. It is important for philosophic theory to be 
aware that the distinct and evident are prized and why they are. But 
it is equally important to note that the dark and twilight abound” 
(Dewey 1929: 20–1, emphasis added).
3. I refer here to the English work of mysticism from the fourteenth 
century, an anonymous guide to the contemplative life that defines 
darkness as “a lacking of knowing” to be entertained as such to 
make space for divine love (Anonymous 1922: 30). One can find a 
rather surprising echo to this classic of negative theology in a recent 
text by Graham Harman, published on the occasion of Documenta 
13. In “The Third Table” he prolongs in an openly mystical tone his 
object-oriented description of a non-sensual withdrawal of intel-
ligible objects, affirming that “[t]he real is something that cannot be 
known, only loved” (Harman 2012: 12).
4. The theological acquaintance of the idea of self-enjoyment is under-
lined in a luminous passage from The Fold: “Satisfaction as a final 
phase, as self-enjoyment, marks the way by which the subject is filled 
with its own data. This is a biblical – and, too, a neo-platonic – notion 
that English empiricism carried to its higher degree (notably with 
Samuel Butler). The plant sings of the glory of God, and while being 
filled all the more with itself it contemplates and intensely contracts 
the elements whence it proceeds. It feels in this prehension the self-
enjoyment of its own becoming” (Deleuze 1993: 78). 
5. See the seminar “Language, media and politics” (Agamben 2012), 
available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5tfv2Hmj6lE. 
For a rigourous discussion of the “dialectics of endarkenment” at the 
heart of Giorgio Agamben’s thinking, see David Kishik, The Power of 
Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics (2012).
6. I am referring here to Lars von Trier’s short “Defocus Manifesto” 
that belongs to a wider movement of resistance against the dic-
tates of sharpness and storytelling. “The ultimate challenge of the 
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future – to see without looking: to defocus! In a world where media 
flock to kneel before the altar of sharpness, draining life out of life 
in the process, the defocusists will be the communicators of our 
era – nothing more, nothing less!” (Trier 2014: 473). Does the force of 
dreaming that traverses every shot of Apichatpong’s cinema not in 
the end speak to an irreducible propensity to defocus?
7. In another interview, a charmingly casual Apichatpong proposes 
a different version of the same anecdote: “In Buddhism, one does 
not really need cinema if one knows how to make use of our mind 
because our mind is the best projector in the world. Across the 
centuries, it accumulates an amount of untold stories – at least 
that’s what Buddhism holds. […] The trick is to know how to decode 
that which has been saved on your hard disk and I think that’s what 
meditation does, or at least I believe. For further information, you 
can always ask David Lynch…” (Weerasethakul 2011), available from:  
http://www.universcine.com/articles/apichatpong-weerasethakul-
le-cinema-tend-a-la-preservation-des-ames-et-notre-esprit-est-un-
appareil-de-projection
8. For a multifaceted, schizoanalysis-inspired exploration of the rela-
tion between cinema and neuroscience, see Pisters (2012).
9. See Marc Menichini’s (2012) “Apichatpong Weerasethakul Recalls His 
Past Films and Future Plans”, available from: http://blogs.indiewire.
com/criticwire/interview-apichatpong-weerasethakul-recalls-his-
past-films-and-future-plans. The film to which Apitchapong refers 
has now been released: Cemetery of Splendour.
10. See, in this respect, Thomas Lamarre’s remarks on the “soul-
ful bodies” that populate Japanese animation films: “The soul-
ful body is analogous to Deleuze’s concept of the time-image” 
(Lamarre 2009: 312).
11. See Deleuze (1993: 11, 23): “Life is not only everywhere, but souls are 
everywhere in matter. […] the whole world is only a virtuality that 
currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey it, the soul 
implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a 
representation of the enclosed world.”
12. This text echoes with remarkable clarity the theological regions 
of Whitehead’s thought, taking as a starting point this marginal 
affirmation from Modes of Thought: “The account of the sixth day 
should be written, He gave them speech and they became souls” 
(Whitehead 1968: 41).
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13. This is my translation from the French original (2002). This passage 
has been quite significantly changed in the English translation. 
Here is the new version of it (most probably re-written by Stengers 
herself): “The specificity of human experience is not defined by its 
limitations, but rather by ‘leaps of the imagination” that respect no 
limitation. Of course, community of intuition still rules and even 
proliferates. But it may also be experienced as such. In addition, the 
entertainment of a new proposition is felt as an event” (Stengers 
2011b: 442).
14. In Semblance and Event, Brian Massumi offers an insightful per-
spective on this question when he affirms that “proprioception is 
natively inventive. It is the body’s in-born technique for the pro-
duction of nonsensuous similarity. The body’s automatic abstrac-
tion method. […] All techniques of existence bringing forth virtual 
events work with proprioception and its privileged connection with 
thought” (2011: 125).
15. About the “element of return at work in every becoming”, see 
Frédéric Neyrat’s book, Homo labyrinthus: humanisme, antihuman-
isme, posthumanisme (2015: 162–6).
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I believe that a film like Tropical Malady tries to imagine a world 
beyond the forms, substances and universal laws of scientific 
reason, and that this is accomplished not through time travel 
(obeying its penchant for universal definitions and reasoning) but 
from a revirtualization (in imagination) of time. Tropical Malady is 
a film that reinvents itself, almost spasmodically, starting from 
“something” that resembles travel, which returns even before 
coming, reintensifies itself elsewhere, and which I declare to be 
– perhaps in slightly too ceremonial a manner – time. I tried to 
study (ethologically speaking) what the film could be made, and 
remade, out of, by following its untimeliness, and not its spacing 
or gaps (which one might simply fill with being), but rather by 
emancipating it from what I call “the [universal, scientific] reason 
of the thinkable”. 
Indeed, that any resemblance between the two segments of 
the film, and its two protagonists proves impossible – that 
organizational structures and themes of efficient causality 
(before-after) are held in abeyance (by the unexplained passage 
between films) – convokes an entirely new ethics based on the 
“moods” of the aesthetic and its micro- or infra-components. In 
such a way that “other possible ways of knowing and doing can 
be contemplated without the charge of irrationality, mysticism, 
or idle fantasy”.1 “Ethology” is the word that I give to this 
contemplation that Denise Ferreira da Silva wishes for. Like her, 
and the poethical figures that she encounters in the works of 
Octavia E. Butler, I am interested in whatever undoes the fixity of 
Time and Space. It is an effort, or an attempt of the imagination 
– and no doubt that fabulation is at the forefront of such an 
undertaking. 
There is a passage in Fred Moten’s In the Break that is worth 
sharing, if only to complicate this matter of the return, of the 
Same, the Iconic, of that which appears to irreversibly re-present 
(itself). Here is what he writes:
Something slips through the cracks or cuts of iconicity, 
likeness, metaphor, such that thinking operates in the 
absence of any real correspondent and translational 
manipulation of the concept of internal similarity or 
pictorial internal relation. […] The question, then, is 
how to describe that experience, and bound up in 
this question is the assumption (pointed to above, 
bitten off Wittgenstein) that description, rather than 
explanation, is the task with which we must now 
be concerned. More precisely, we must attempt a 
description of an experience whose provenance 
or emergence is not reducible to logical structure, 
pictorial internal relation or internal similarity; it 
is an experience of the passage or cut that cannot 
be explained because those formulations upon 
which our explanations must be grounded – spooky 
actions at a distance; communication between 
space-time separated entities; rigid, naturalized, 
but anti-phenomenal samenesses – are themselves 
so profoundly without ground. Like the strange 
correspondence between distant particles, like the 
mysteries of communication with the dead (or with 
tradition), the paradoxically elective and imperative 
affinities of and within ensemble are to be described 
within a radical improvisation of the very idea of 
description (in and through its relation to explanation), 
one that would move us from hidden and ontologically 
fixed likeness to the anarchization of variation, 
variation not (on) but of – and thus with(out[from-the-
outside]) – a theme.2
There are many things to be pulled out of this quotation, but 
I would like to draw attention to the idea of an “anarchized” 
description and variation that leaves no chance or respite for 
generalized equivalences. In the cut, whether it be internal 
(to a film) or external (between films), something happens 
and something “strange” occurs and is transmitted, in spite 
of the irreversibly separated. It is the affinities, the bonds, 
that are themselves strange. And how can we describe these 
passages, these speeds (against aggressive deterritorializations 
or explanatory accelerations)? It seems to me that each essay 
in this book tries to describe in its own way how the variation 
(and deformation) of an event is the effect of an outside more 
distant than any form of exteriority, a passage that is irreducible 
to any given symptom or symptomatic explanation. It is from 
the outside that the variation of what we believe to be the same 
operates. This outside – these intensive affinities – remains 
inexplicable from the point of view of someone who records the 
movement of variation’s forces.
In a collaboration, in order to be able to make something 
(through improvisation and/or composition), one must invest 
in this confidence from one to another, this belief or this “love 
supreme” as it is incarnated in one of John Coltrane’s albums. In 
the case of Apichatpong, I would go so far as to say that the film-
to-be-made participates in the construction (and continuation) of 
a friendship, a bond, an attachment. Take Cemetery of Splendour: 
the entire film is an ode, if not a love letter to Jenjira Pongpas. 
She and Apichatpong have known each other for such a long 
time that she is a part of his life (perhahps even his lives, the kind 
that breathe life into his films). Each one of Apichatpong’s films 
is like a family portrait, or portrait of friends. There are things, 
relations (between actors and directors, for example), alliances, 
pacts and linkages that are undone more slowly than others, 
and even some for which one would do anything to never have 
to let them go. If one engages the question of irreversibility, one 
quickly realizes that it is inseparable from the problems raised by 
duration and the ephemerally given.
There are tendencies that cannot be reversed, but that is also 
what defines us as provisional effects. Irreversible does not 
mean eternal, let alone immortal. If our tendency is to endure 
– but only with the transience this verb gives us – what is it that 
we hold dear, that moves us, which gives life, again? Who do we 
want near and be close to? What sort of surrounding or sociality 
do we want? What materials are our alliances made of? What is 
it that we care about? And my answer to each of these questions 
barely varies: that the world has the capacity to believe in us and 
establish mutual trust. That Apichatpong creates a cinema out of 
love (for a people, a person, for the cinema itself) is what touches 
me the most deeply and makes me want to write “with” him. I’m 
interested in that which creates or makes a link, beyond these 
notions of irreversibility and chronology. 
I will always remember this story, told to me years ago by my 
father, about our neighbour, a real fan of television series who, 
in spite of passing years in front of her tiny screen, couldn’t 
understand how a character who died in one series could be 
resurrected and survive in another,3 before dying and coming 
back to life yet again. Clearly, she couldn’t take as given or 
normal this (dis)continuity effect, even if death (disjunction) 
had already struck once. It’s because the return of the same 
remains the exception to the rule. Thus, it is evident that a work 
of art has this wonderful, miraculous capacity to short-circuit 
common sense, the logic of the living and the dead, the logic of 
from-life-to-death. That is what the following study of Tropical 
Malady elaborates. It makes habits falter in order for a whole new 
series of perceptions, and even suspicions, to arise, so that, in 
the encounter, they can inspire other ways of speaking (to each 
other), touching (each other) and thinking (oneself). We must, 
just like Apichatpong, develop a sort of patience, a slow and 
rigourous pragmatism in front of something that we believe to be 
identical with something else. 
M. NourbeSe Philip comes to mind and this sentence in 
particular: “Repetition drives the event and the memory 
simultaneously, becoming a haunting, becoming spectral in its 
nature.”4 Apichatpong’s actors are those who, in the proper sense 
of the word, haunt his cinema relentlessly, exchange roles no 
matter their age, and repeat themselves in spite of having aged 
– irreversibly mortal. This is, among other things, what I wanted 
to describe in saying that his films are “dreams to be followed”. 
Fantasies and ghosts that are at once to be followed and to 
be continued [à suivre]. For me, the friendship, the love, that I 
suspect between Apichatpong and his actors is at the centre of 
this haunting and this continuation (differentiation, dramatic 
variation), without which there would be nothing left to do. 
Intercession invokes this differentiation. There is a sentence by 
Eunsong Kim that makes me think of Apichatpong’s practice and 
mine: “You cannot do what I do because you do not love who I 
love.”5 The question of practices (of making) is entangled with a 
love that also needs to be made. 
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Of That Which Gives Life, Again
I live from an underlying layer of feelings: I am 
barely alive
Clarice Lispector (2012: 19)
It begins with a quotation by Japanese novelist Ton Nakajima, 
gracing the film’s opening, that must be read as a warning (“We 
are all, by nature, wild animals. Our task as human beings is to 
become like the tamers who hold their animals under control 
and train them to do things that go against their bestial nature”), 
quickly followed by an image of outstanding cruelty. It is prefaced 
by a statement insisting as much on our “human nature” as our 
“task” of becoming human (at this point, one may fear that the 
film is an elaboration of this inaugural commandment) and, 
shortly after, with the meeting between a nameless, lifeless body, 
and a squad of armed soldiers who encircle it; a pale, cadaveric 
body strewn on the grass in the middle of a forest. There lies a 
dead body, yet the soldiers, all smiles, don’t miss the opportunity 
to rejoice and delight as if all tragedy could be avoided. Nobody 
mourns the passing of this unidentified body (we never see the 
face of the victim) that one of the soldiers simply happened 
to “find”. Each of them wants to be pictured, victorious, in the 
company of the cadaver; they smile and nobody moves. The 
photographic moment inserts itself into the cinematic flow of 
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images. The photo’s primary function is not to remember the 
deceased through a mnemonic technique that conjures up the 
forgotten; no, this photo that the soldiers take, and that we 
ourselves see being taken, is meant to capture the moment and 
archive the event to which they respond as present and alive. It 
is not death which precipitates their memory, but the life proper 
to them. They do not see human death, but the gaze of an other 
mixed up with theirs, the vision of the screen, the elective site of 
their attention. 
The remains of the dead end up being carried on a stretcher. One 
of the soldiers, holding a walkie-talkie, attempts a radiophonic 
liaison with a woman with whom he has fallen in love. Yet the 
signal quality starts to fade; the speech of his interlocutor 
reaches him as a bunch of cryptic sounds. (For the temporality 
of a long-distance romance is bound to produce interferences 
that alter meanings and generate new ones.) Pop music starts to 
play. An individual, stripped naked, wanders through the image, 
partnered, it seems, with the landscape where the soldiers 
were seen. In any case, it is possible that the naked man and the 
armed soldiers never cross paths. 
But still: a few minutes later, it begins yet again when the credits 
appear on top of one of the soldiers who, considering his 
presence on the screen, is surely aware of his being exposed. 
Tropical Malady: the title of the film, amidst an orchestra of 
crickets, fully reveals itself. Keng (Banlop Lomnoi), the soldier 
who falls in love before our eyes, maybe even for our eyes, feigns 
indifference for that which takes place behind or in front of this 
image without counter-shot (an image that assures the alterity 
of our intimidating gaze – us being the vision of the screen). This 
smile and this look, both mischievous, uncover us; we know 
ourselves to be seen, and even charmed. Or according to Didi-
Huberman’s formulation, “that which we see only gives – or lives 
– itself to our eyes by that which regards us” (Didi-Huberman 
1992: 9). Keng’s eyes can’t be stopped from rolling and sweeping 
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across the screen, stretching an erotic gaze between his world 
and the scene of our own projection. So reluctant to confront us, 
or even face us directly, his eyes move from one part of the shot 
to another, in order to better latch onto our existence which, as 
ghostly as it is, would not know how to succumb to indifference.1 
Their movement undoubtedly stems from the actor consciously 
playing his role, as they reinvest a sense of modesty and naivety 
that falsely departs from the narrative project. The soldier’s 
hesitant attitude towards the camera lens goes as far as to raise 
suspicion about the fictive character of the work – it needs to be 
said that Apichatpong’s protagonists occasionally take advantage 
of their roles to entertain the possibility of belonging to (and 
longing for) a film world, acknowledging the dreamlike quality 
and ghostly assemblage of their experience. 
Appearing close to ten minutes after the first image, the credits 
bother (what appeared to be) the beginning of the film. But 
someone – or is it the film itself? – proclaims that an image has 
already-always started without us; that it is impossible for the 
force of change to begin and end for us.2 Alas! Even though we 
took care to arrive on time (or was it before time?). But after all 
what, strictly speaking, constitutes a beginning? Is it true that 
cinematic art, in order to function, requires a human decision 
(and gaze)? And most of all, to what extent is it even necessary 
to ontologize traditions – being at the beginning/ beginning 
for being – when art can easily do without punctuality and 
measurement? Apichatpong’s cinema never stops singing the 
refrain of a time liberated from volitional and individuated forms. 
One can agree with Guattari, channeling Nietzsche, and say: 
“Everything has to continually begin again from zero, at the point 
of chaosmic emergence: power of eternal return to the nascent 
state” (Guattari 1995: 94). For it is hardly after beginning that the 
film re-establishes a “point of emergence” that has been but also 
will be. And:
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As you can see, it’s impossible for me to deepen and 
take possession of life, which is aerial, is my light 
breath. But I do know what I want here: I want the 
inconclusive. I want the profound organic disaster that 
nevertheless hints at an underlying order. The great 
potency of potentiality. (Lispector 2012: 20)
And if, wanting the inconclusive, we ricochet off the limit of 
thought, it is because we are struggling with the gravity of our 
finitude, of our held breath. So fugitive and exhaled is this life 
which Lispector perceives, that it leaves us with images “barely 
alive” and words barely finished, barely there. If the eternal 
didn’t want the cut, if the cut didn’t want the eternal singularity 
of time-without-time, we would continue to believe in the rarity 
or preciousness of things. And to think that by a feeling, if not 
an intuition, we dismiss the tragedy of apnea, exhaling the 
inestimable “potency of potentiality”.
Neither beginning nor conclusion. All the less because: as Keng 
arrives at his beloved’s home and begins to browse a photo 
album; as we witness the birth of a loving relationship between 
Tong (Sakda Kaewbuadee), a young man from the country, and 
the soldier (who ends up succumbing to his charms); and while 
nobody objects to their love affair – punctuated by long walks in 
the city and forest, ordinary enough of activities,3 consisting as 
much of modesty as romantic clichés – the inexplicable makes 
itself felt.4
I say the inexplicable only because I want to account for a cut 
whose intervention into the stream of images can’t be clarified, 
conditioning the start of an nth film, the establishment of an nth 
fabulation around a spirit that, wandering in the forest, torments 
its residents. A story of ghosts, of “wild animals”. The story of 
a soldier who takes himself for a hero and hunts this demon 
capable of appearances equally strange and familiar in the 
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meanderings of the jungle-night. It is the course of the film that 
finds itself deviated, most of all from its narrative tendency. 
Thus we veer towards A Spirit’s Path, following the appearance 
of the credits on top of a coarsely drawn tiger, in a becoming-
painting of the screen (that oscillates with the drawing). By 
way of the cut, A Spirit’s Path becomes Apichatpong’s nth 
proposition, one inspired by a Noi Inthanon’s short story5, 
with Banlop Lomnoi and Sakda Kaewbuadee in the title roles. 
Except that, in this case, we land in the year of aphasia: since 
instead of assuming the roles they play during the first half of 
the work – which we can call film 1 for the purpose of this study 
– the protagonists find themselves propelled to another level 
of action. The two men are no longer recognizable in the same 
way, neither to us nor to themselves. It is their excessive and 
omnipresent smiles from film 1 that lie beneath the malicious 
traits of film 2.6 It is Tropical Malady ( film 1)’s pop sensibility that 
slides underneath A Spirit’s Path ( film 2)’s logic of predation. The 
possible is distributed otherwise. Enough for us to press for – in 
light of the reversal to which we bear witness, the positions that 
are activated, the antagonisms and (counter)tendencies that 
operate –  an ethology of images.
Yet, the problem isn’t to determine how we arrive at such a 
détournement, but to admit into our study the types of perception 
that it triggers, as Weerasethakul’s words seem to entail: “In 
film, it’s more of a gradual accumulation of feelings” (Kim 2011: 
48). And as it feels increasingly, a film – indefinite from its own 
perspective – emerges.  Certainly, the faces are not unfamiliar 
to us, but the shape of their encounter reshuffle the cards 
of our normal (habitual) modes of perception. We are called 
to be attentive to the ruse, to the new forces thrown into the 
defamiliarized bodies; the undressing of one revealing a tattooed 
body from head to toe. What anguish, what fright, fills the eyes 
of the naked man and the soldier once they are face-to-face for 
the nth time! 
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The paradox of the return is that they may have encountered 
each other twice, each occasion having also been the first; they 
haven’t forgotten anything either since they are only, each time, 
discovering each other/themselves. One is not even the same 
in the eyes of the other, since it appears to have never been. 
“The forgotten thing appears in person to the memory which 
essentially apprehends it” (Deleuze 1994:140). The forgotten 
in the nth: how then to dissociate the before from the after 
if the principle of recognition applies to neither of them? The 
reappearance of their habitual modes of perception must 
necessarily be suspended: undoing the habit that we have 
contracted; contracting new ones; giving value to the variation of 
the performance. Vulnerable, neither seen nor known, is how the 
soldier and the naked man appear to their respective memories: 
it is by the cut that they essentially come into sight. Their meeting 
speaks for a time that neither comes before nor after, a time that 
attests to this encounter and not another one. Forgotten, that 
is how Tropical Malady appears, having fallen into the shadow 
of a block of amnesic images, “almost aphasic, now standing in 
the void, now shivering in the open” (Deleuze 1995: 9). It is time 
itself that doesn’t remember anything, that opens beyond its 
personalizations and recollections. Only a singularity remembers 
– which is a way of saying that one remembers everything, but 
also nothing without being judged.
No doubt, it is an illness to believe in the return of individuated 
forms and subjects, and to believe in the universality of a lived 
perception. But it is an illness that needs to be overcome. As it 
is true that that which returns through the earth’s centrifugal 
expression is not the same, or in other words identical, but a 
dramatic variation. That the cut resets the counter to zero and 
releases a new memory taking the already seen for the unseen, 
for something forgotten and unknown: it is without remembering 
the other that one appears, that one finds oneself apprehended, 
seized by the memory of the other. Recognition does not prevail 
since the event of archaic fixations is offset and because the 
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film itself unarchives the memory of its previous occurrences. 
The dismissal of recognition parallels the dissolution of a 
measured time, one that is dictated by individuated forms and 
subjected to apodicted certitudes. Truth does not have to be 
unmasked, but in various ways, the mask meets the conditions 
for an affirmation of the multiplicity of being. Why would a 
thinker like Kierkegaard draw out two different trends of time 
(and its rehearsals)? Maybe because one would never be able 
to conquer the melancholia of existence without having to 
unleash its own prophecies. “Repetition and recollection are the 
same movement, just in opposite directions, because what is 
recollected has already been and is thus repeated backwards, 
whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards” (Kierkegaard 
2009: 3). Such that, in clear opposition to the retrogression of 
memory, the two men are called to remember forwards, that is to 
activate the differential element of their existence. And if, under 
the sting of the forgotten, nothing comes before and nothing 
comes after, it is because the cut, neatly executed, testifies to 
the contemporaneity of films 1 and 2. At the same time, that 
which has taken place coexists with that which will come into 
existence. At the same time, by way of the cut, the present has 
happened and has not happened yet, deprived of all clarity and 
instantaneity. In short, no time has passed between 1 and 2. 
The cut could possibly be mistaken for a dividing line between a 
before and an after, but the fact of the matter is that through the 
absence of recognition between films 1 and 2 it is the arrow of 
time that proves to be broken. To echo a well-known expression 
of Deleuze and Guattari, the cut here has the value not of lack 
but of desire.7 A desire of and for itself; desiring desire, without 
any goal but to dissolve the beating of time. Thus it is neither 
with the past nor with the future that one needs to break, but 
with a certain habit that situates them on both sides of an 
agonizing present, exhausted of its potentialities, even though 
the latter has not stopped giving (or desiring) with its untimely 
figurations. Clarice Lispector’s “I am barely alive,” cited in the 
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epigraph, is not to be confused with a person full of agony, but 
corresponds more closely to the more-than-aware singularity of 
an event equally unbearable as uncontainable by a subject. 
That through which we pass – from 1 to 2 – is nothing but a 
temporal complex whose memory is integral to its proper break: 
a break with the usual, clichéd sense of time; with the need to 
submit each image to comparison, as if between them, in spite of 
them, the manufacturing of a narrative should occur, following 
a scheme of intelligible reduction. The passage from 1 to 2 (and 
vice versa since the ordering of efficient causality is a product 
of such reduction) enacts a type of “pseudo-narrative detour”8 
that leaves no dogma standing and no certitude binding their 
alliance. In passing (away, with, from, towards), the very meaning 
and necessity of an ethology of images emerges based on the 
attitudes and the affects that traverse them, rather than on their 
supposed sensory-motor liaisons. 
If it seems difficult to understand the film’s temporality based 
on a metric denominator, it is precisely because it obscures all 
definition or measure, and because the tropicality of the spirit and 
the path of the malady never stop modifying and implicating one 
another. We may try to add them up yet we must return to the 
cuts that each begin and end with. As long as it is, the film (but 
which film?) is always simultaneously and topologically more 
and less than we consciously determine. The reality of the film-
during-the-film is there to remind us such elusiveness. For from 
the point of view of any beginning everything seems without 
precedence – anoriginally and indefinitely open.
Pragmatically speaking, our knowledge of the film, of its 
duration, is undermined the moment we pay attention to (and 
inquire about) its intensive qualities: we do not know how to 
delineate its contours as long as its lines continue to inform 
a cartography that does not begin nor end with our decision. 
It is, practically speaking, impossible to have a clear vision or 
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understanding of its body. Any ethological study of the film, 
therefore, must admit a topology of latitudinal (according to this 
or that degree of intensity) and longitudinal (under this or that 
extensive set of relations) forces according to which the film 
exceeds and composes (with and beyond) itself. The telos of 
beginning-and-end is unworthy of the film’s anexactitude, of its 
anti-narrative and anti-psychological singularizations. 
Deformation of people, dissolution or involution of forms: it 
seems that in keeping from sacrificing the detours and the 
sentience of the event, Apichatpong facilitates the contemplation 
of a variety of existential styles that are unlocalizable with 
respect to a desubjectivized time. It is not that the stories have 
to be followed or told in a particular order but, rather, that a tale 
(which Apichatpong multiplies) guides us across a field of fugal/
transversal experimentation, a film-during-a-film, to liberate the 
dramatic variations of speed between rhythmic becomings and 
appetitions of all sort. “Weerasethakul’s unique compression 
of past, present and future defines a filmic present that 
encapsulates everything that has happened before as something 
that is happening again” ( Joo 2011: 92). In spite of narrative 
development, the time of Tropical Malady is at once unlocalizable 
and ineffable. 
Wherever, whenever: a film is a dream to follow and be continued. 
A film comes alive and vibrates in its own right, setting its 
precedent. All this to say that by deviating from the romantic 
narrative between the two men, Apichatpong does not pretend 
that it ends. For it continues, or could be continuing, along 
another trajectory, one that refuses the status and the identity 
of the present. Film 1 could be the alternative to begin with (+1). 
The alternative never being anything but folded inside of the 
image, co-present in the actual regime of experience – refusing 
the dilemma (to choose) between a before and an after. The 
event takes place but the intensification continues elsewhere 
(otherwise), thus exceeding the finished image-concept and the 
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narrative project. It is a matter of abolishing the individuality 
of the present: past-present and present-future coexist in the 
differential and transitional element of the cut. 
That which goes on between the two regimes of images (+ 1) 
affirms them both as alternatives and as manners of existence. 
This is how Apichatpong discovers an even richer life, more 
contingent and varied than one may think: triggering a series 
of micro-perceptions that look beyond (or below) the strictures 
of the actual to locate barely lived trajectories. As a result, 
Apichatpong’s images of the everyday – the sort that appear 
during the credits of film 1, exemplified by fleeting shots of 
shopkeepers noticing the camera’s presence – are always 
concurrent with (and transversal to) otherwise realities. At every 
occasion, Apichatpong assumes the right to disarm truth of its 
promontory authority.
***
“I would like to remember the time when I was still in my 
mother’s womb, but I don’t have the concentration for that” 
(Weerasethakul 2009: 105). When and where did everything 
begin? Neither Weerasethakul, nor anybody else for that matter 
could know how to remember a life that was never entirely their 
own. This is a proposition that can be annexed to the fact that 
the beginning is a limit that Boonmee (from the eponymous 
film), ghost of his past lives, is unable to reach. And Boonmee’s 
memory does not exhaust itself unless the possible withers 
away, and the faculty of vision reaches its proper limit, in a 
blind image (“What happened to my eyes? They are open, but 
I do not see anything”), and that thought comes up against 
its own confines, to the point of making memory impossible 
(“Here is where I was born, in a life that I no longer remember”). 
Thus, could there not be something unforgettable only in the 
broadest of lives, vaster than any immensity, any qualified 
extension? Could there not be something unforgettable only 
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in that which has not yet started; wherein the beginning, the 
birth, the start, never came? It is on the contrary everything 
that has been rendered possible which exposes itself to being 
forgotten. What memory is the most capable of, all things 
considered, is apprehending the lived as something forgotten 
and irrecoverable. A future, unforgettable. 
To call up the past in the form of an image, we must 
be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of 
the moment, we must have the power to value the 
useless, we must have the will to dream. Man alone 
is capable of such an effort. But even in him the past 
to which he returns is fugitive, ever on the point 
of escaping him, as though his backward turning 
memory were thwarted by the other, more natural, 
memory, of which the forward movement bears him 
on to action and to life. (Bergson 1991: 85–6)
If what “bears [one] on to action and life” can be called belief, 
it must undeniably be found in the conditions where we are 
ready to contract whatever necessary, to struggle for new spaces 
of thought, sensation and perception. One needs to have the 
temperament of a warrior – one that troubles the established 
values and moral codes that turn this world into an appearance 
and life into an anomaly. It is the ethic in which one must believe 
in order to pass from film to film without being dominated by an 
image of the past. Except that this passage effects a liquidation 
of a certain type of learning, the evisceration of certain ways of 
intervening in the past and selecting that which seems useful to 
our actual perception. Yes, perception must learn what it takes to 
acquire a habit!9 
I am humble and don’t without uneasiness awaken a 
past for a long time dead. Whatever knowledge they 
have of it, the livings do not possess the past as they 
believe to: if they think to hold it, the latter escapes 
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them. I give myself excuses: building my theory, I 
didn’t forget that it leads to a movement which is 
elusive; I could situate only thus the sacrifice which is 
incumbent upon us. (Bataille 1988: 133–4)
Staying as close as possible to this “movement” in which 
Kierkegaard, Bataille and Bergson participate, we must now 
ask how the ethical contraction that Apichatpong proposes is 
conditioned by the runaway movement that agitates many of 
his images. 
Taking film 1 for example: we are at Tong’s workplace, an ice 
factory where the images flow in intermittent manner, without 
any explanation. We surprise the young man cutting a block 
of ice, before he stands and directs his gaze off-screen; the 
following shot frames a statue in the foreground depicting a 
swan about to take flight. The background is populated by a 
river lined with houses, a road, etc. The camera remains fixed, 
punctuated by the occasional zoom. The worker is evacuated 
from the profilmic field; the image only retains the constant 
whine of the factory’s ice cutting machines. A swan, a river, a 
riverbank, houses, cars, trees, the sky: nothing extravagant or 
beautiful in this image of a banal byroad apparently so trivial 
that it only makes sense to itself. How could the image teach us 
anything about the psychological state of the character, when 
Tong’s gaze exhausts itself and merges with the image (the shot 
ends with a fade to black), in its elementarity (muddy water, a 
milky sky, the earth, a riverbank whose meaning we know not), 
and its vivacity (everything is in movement, including the swan 
“caught” in his tracks, and the slicing of the ice sawing away 
off-screen)? Tropical Malady ( films 1 and 2) is laced with details, 
gestures of this type, images filled with ineffability, opening onto 
indeterminacy, without precise direction. 
Or this other scene from film 1, where Tong’s dog watches 
over his master sleep in a hammock. The animal is caught in 
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anticipation, ears perked, ready to… Ready for what, all things 
considered? Neither man, nor dog is determined to move; one 
sleeps while the other watches. And yet, all we try to imagine is 
the movement that could lead one or the other to move in one 
way or another. Image at zero intensity, animated by a degree 
of irresolution. What will it do? What will happen to it? What 
the animal is capable of, we do not know. But how long (this) 
perception is! To wait or anticipate. But wait for or anticipate 
what? That is how much the sign of the image is on the verge 
of unraveling.
It’s the entire Weerasethakul-operation that is a counterpointed 
un-telling, interspersed with various channels – in fugal 
composition – like so many pathways or subterranean plans. A 
number of the “pseudonarrative” digressions in Uncle Boonmee 
Who Can Recall His Past Lives exemplify how each of Apichatpong’s 
films is offset by some other story: a fugitive buffalo returns 
to his master, a photographer is caught in a becoming-monkey, 
a deceased spouse reappears at dinner time, a princess and 
a catfish are sexually coupled, a ghost (re)appears, Boonmee 
dies (again), burning red eyes sparkle, a monk births his own 
doppelgänger, and so on… Such is the force (and the cut-up 
style) of the pseudo-narrative deviation: to thwart our need for 
efficient causality. Even in the interior of each story emerges an 
adventure, an alternate route, inhabiting and multiplying points 
of view. Each line establishes itself as the blueprint of another 
one, each point of view as the milieu of an alternative thrust. 
***
A soldier mourns in verse (and song) at the end of A Spirit’s Path: 
“At present, it is myself that I see. Mother. Father. Fear. Sadness. 
All of this has been so real, so real, that it has given me life.” But 
what is this “it” to which the man refers? What is this it “so real” 
that is for him the breath of life even when faced with the threats 
of a tiger? One would think that it was for him, as for Lispector, 
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to live “from an underlying layer of feelings”, to be barely alive, 
barely there. And that he never knew how to live life (and never 
could), having long since wandered in the jungle like a ghost of 
the future, of the past, who never had the chance to feel the 
fear nor the sadness of being incarnated. That is exactly why 
the experiential unconscious (it) is at once father, mother and 
orphan, generativity of all generations (illegitimate and non-
causal). It is also why the indefiniteness of that which gives life, 
as much as it is made of the tiger, trees, people, and cosmos that 
innervate his vision, is without memory of anyone or anything. 
Becoming is that which literally evades, flees, and 
escapes mimesis, whether imitative or reproductive 
(“Mimicry is a very bad concept”), as much as memesis, 
both mnemonic and historical. Becoming is amnesic, 
prehistorical, aniconic, and sterile: it is difference in 
practice. (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 159–60) 
How could we doubt for even a moment that a life has always 
preceded us, and always passes us by? How could we doubt that 
a lifeline runs through the self, exceeding all beginnings and 
endings of subjective existence? Nothing is self-evident, and life 
is in no way reducible to a few well-ordered traits or behaviours. 
The becoming in the it is not made in anyone or anything’s image, 
or to please anyone, and without any historical generalization. 
This is what the cut from +1 to 2 exemplifies (the becoming 
of a film – left undefined “in practice” – is itself “amnesic” and 
“prehistorical”: an image without an image, that is to say without 
memory). This is also what the soldier in A Spirit’s Path admits 
with an emotion that makes felt the importance and intensity 
(the so contained in the so real) of a life that is given to him. 
That is to say, by the vigorous passage of that which remembers 
nothing and thus gives life (this “difference” that Viveiros de 
Castro speaks of), the latter finds himself in the vertiginous 
moment of a life barely lived. 
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***
The force of the image against the reason of the thinkable: we 
have not sufficiently underlined to what extent Apichatpong’s 
cinema serves an indefinition of the present, working in the 
immediacy of the relation between past and future, and the 
extent to which his films enact a time-without-time, that is to say 
a passage, an emotion entirely exempt from beginning or end. To 
say it in the manner of Duchamp, this passage is “infrathin”: the 
delay between pastness and futurity can barely be isolated.10 And 
if Tropical Malady calls forth a thought of the infrathin, perhaps 
it is because the film inspires a trans-apparitional practice of 
the image – of an image for the making, to be assembled from 
the middle of what defeats the distribution and evaluation of 
time. A thought that transforms itself into the equivalent of an 
ethical act, an act of faith: not in the hereafter, but in a life during 
life, contemporary (and not posthumous) to this life. Indeed, 
nothing stipulates that individuality is the site of a dream or the 
epicentre of a life. It is in this vein that Whitehead can write: “Life 
lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices 
of the brain” (Whitehead: 1978: 105–6). And it is in this vein that 
Apichatpong never stops splitting his characters apart, situating 
them outside of themselves, beyond true and false, like when 
the monk in Uncle Boonmee sees the man who he has been in 
spite of who he will be, all in the very same moment. As if time 
itself lives according to a mode of interstitiality and ghostliness, 
far from homeostatic equilibrium, irreducible to any given cell 
or individualized image. Apichatpong’s modes of existence, even 
when they enter into strange relations, bow to the necessity – the 
innocent necessity – of an in-between where they oscillate and 
eclipse one another. 
At once terrifying and inspiring: an effect can precede its cause. 
The making of time: is it not that which Apichatpong’s images look 
towards? Beyond the labor of re-membering and dis-membering. 
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But how to extract a sensibility from the force of change? How to 
give life to “the moving web of time,” to take up Didi-Huberman’s 
formulation (Didi-Huberman 2002: 273)?11 We understand here 
the difficult challenge of the film that Apichatpong is committed 
to make: channelling this inordinate time-without-an-image, 
that “in order to become visible, ‘seeks bodies and everywhere 
encounters them, seizes them to cast its magic lantern upon 
them’ ” (Deleuze 2008: 13).12 There is no cause for concern about 
the fact that Apichatpong invents so much time to create his 
images: a duration, even an eternity, but an eternity that needs 
to be conceived no matter what. The image (and the so-called 
narration that compliments it) becomes the flight plan (a slow 
eternal detour) of a time-passage which can only be made – as 
long as there is a desire for and especially from it. The time of 
images, thus desired by Apichatpong, breathes entanglement 
and indefinition, so that we cannot say exactly where we land, or 
where we stop to rest, as brief as such a pause may be. At least, 
if we were to read Whitehead’s cosmology through Lispector’s 
ode to life, we could argue that every time we say “now” or “I live” 
we create nothing but a plane of experimentation, trying to get a 
hold of that which is all too elusive.   
Life is the enjoyment of emotion, derived from the 
past and aimed at the future. It is the enjoyment of 
emotion which was then, which is now, and which will 
be then. This vector character is of the essence of such 
entertainment. The emotion transcends the present 
in two ways. It issues from, and it issues toward. It is 
received, it is enjoyed, and it is passed along, from 
moment to moment. (Whitehead 1968: 44)13
Apichatpong’s images and situations never fail to underline 
that experience is beholden to this emergence (“from” and 
“towards”) that Whitehead houses under the notion of – at first 
sight, personalized – emotion. If the past never ceases to be, but 
continues to haunt, it must also be said that the future is never 
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quite exempt from a present that ceaselessly moves in it, and 
“that the same ‘now ’ both ends [the reader’s] past and begins 
his future” ( James 2003: 42). But in what, and why, should we 
rejoice if we live more in/of these entanglements than in/of a 
categorical present? Maybe because the experience of passage 
(whose terms must not be given in advance and violence) is 
tantamount to the creative emotion that defends us from all 
individual isolation. Because passages are the only points of 
view, the only realities that prevail under the beam of an aesthetic 
of the earth: de-touring (with, away, from, towards) itself. In 
fact, in light of Apichatpong’s propositions, we must reshape 
this idea of emergence as laid out by Whitehead, and fostered 
by James: one cannot help but see that Tropical Malady gives a 
sense of emergence that is not as straight and unilinear as it 
sounds in the latter quotes. With respect to Apichatpong’s time-
images, provenance and aim do not belong to any apprehension 
(or region) of time. Future-past, transversibly and indefinitely 
desired: a movement must be experimented in order to arrive at 
their limit.
To restore this ante-linear passage: there is no better way 
to conceive Apichatpong’s artistic trajectory, his manner of 
constructing (with his own) refrains. Arnika Fuhrmann’s claim 
about Keng and Tong’s homosexual desire, as one that comes 
against the normative enactments and rehearsals of time, 
through its ordinary rendition and “noncoherent quality,” can’t be 
emphasized enough (Fuhrmann 2016: 131). With Tropical Malady 
it is the image of time (of its re-production) that is queered out by 
a love relationship that belongs neither to a before (as primitive) 
nor to an after (postponed as a threat), but is expressed outside 
the beating of time. 
“A vagrant now and again” (Delany 1994: 20, 79):14 this is the 
sort of refrain that makes science-fiction heavyweights like 
Samuel R. Delany, who want to capture that all too elusive and 
ephemeral pull from the faintest light at the end of the tunnel, 
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a must-read alongside films like Tropical Malady. Apichatpong 
never renounces the idea of a time that is essentially floating and 
entangled, implying the coexistence of a past that is no longer 
and a future that is not yet with an open, undefined present. 
“In the singularity of paradoxes,” affirms Deleuze, “nothing 
begins or ends, everything proceeds at once in the direction 
of both past and future” (1990: 80). The force and singularity 
of the journey, not in time, but of time itself, is to know how to 
“pass-ify” and “futurize” itself all at the same time, to not give 
itself as such. But is not emotion, or the “with” in the com-plex, 
the only indefinitely multiple (non)sense of “at the same time”? 
Apichatpong best articulates this idea through the character 
of Boonmee (a dreamer, or someone who remembers his own 
future anterior, which the film title refers to as “lives”), or even 
through the amorous/hateful relationships in films 1 and 2. The 
problem of sense (as tendency) in Apichatpong’s work is not 
reducible to a contradiction, it is before all else paradoxical, 
struck with (e)motion. 
***
I find the following passage in Georges Bataille’s Inner Experience: 
“Experience is, in fever and anguish, the putting into question 
(to the test) of that which a man knows of being” (Bataille 1988: 
4). And I realize, in a transversal reading of Bataille, that it is in 
sweat and wonder that the soldier of film 2, after having crawled 
in a style contrary to his human nature, has no other option 
but to confront the tiger whose spirit he stalked; that it is in the 
dangerous proximity between feline and soldier, both immersed 
in a night of ecstasy, that what it means to be human is put to the 
test. It’s that, suddenly, the animality of the soldier is skittishly 
linked to the tigerly eloquence of the spirit. The tiger’s language 
enters into a process of transduction (of fabulatory subtitling, 
similar to the monkey who addresses himself to the soldier 
earlier on), wherein it instructs the human to surrender. There 
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are no lips to read or interpret, only flowing voices that collide 
and distort. 
But who considers themselves human and who considers 
themselves animal in this story? It’s a deceptive situation. 
To be honest, I do not know if the word “reversibility” refers 
as adequately as possible to this transition of animality, but 
nevertheless I can assert that a real indeterminacy concerning 
each body’s position on the spectrum of living flesh erases the 
anthropological division that would invalidate the perspective, 
the by-path, or the by-way, of the tigerly human. Apichatpong’s 
intercession, or shamanism, ecstatically rises up against such 
a “bifurcation of nature” 15 in a final sequence that mutually 
implicates the spoken reality of the animal and the bestial 
becoming of the soldier. The moral injunction of the film’s 
opening scene, attributed to the Japanese novelist, fades before 
the night, before the beast, before the indeterminacy of the 
soldier’s speech and subjection. And I say “indeterminacy”, not 
only because the night becomes feline, but because it is also 
solar. This can be seen quite clearly in Tropical Malady ’s epilogue, 
where the greenery of the treetops recedes into the dawning of a 
new day, coupled to the unveiling of another night. 
Even though I grew up in a small town where the land 
is flat, there were strange animal sounds in a quiet 
night not unlike those up on the hills. The tales and 
the landscapes were imprinted in my mind. I always 
imagine a parallel world with these elements, one 
where I did not physically live. When I had a chance 
to make films, which in itself is to create another 
world, I always resorted to this jungle. The love and 
fear of mysterious darkness and jungle became my 
addiction, along with filmmaking. (Weerasethakul in 
Quandt 2009: 225)
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A condition, a request from and for cinema: that the day is 
eclipsed for the duration of an image, a dream, of a ghostly 
existence. But one essential question remains: where to place 
the limit between day and night if not in a contrast,16 in a passage 
liberated from systematic and formal pretentions? How and 
where can one make an image of a time-without-time, that is, 
an image without beginning or end, if not from the “mysterious 
opacity” of a vitality – albeit it a ghostly vitality – irreducible to 
the conventions of perception? Accordingly, the untranslatability 
of the monkey and the tiger’s speech, in spite of the words they 
are endowed with, may be simply a symptom of their anoriginary 
entanglement. Fabulation – if the term is susceptible enough to 
this kind of spooky-talk-at-a-distance – is an essential part of the 
human/non-human junction, and the nurturing of their mutual 
opacity. There is no difference to reduce, no strangeness to 
elucidate/see through the motif of a higher apprehension. 
In this version of understanding the verb to grasp 
contains the movement of hands that grab their 
surroundings and bring them back to themselves. 
A gesture of enclosure if not appropriation. Let our 
understanding prefer the gesture of giving-on-and-
with that opens finally on totality. (Glissant 1997: 91)
Transparencies (relations to the self) are abbreviations of a 
trans-forming world. But if we insist on the creation of difference, 
from difference (as departure), it is because the only way to 
succeed in doing so is to remain concerned with the ineffable 
(that is untranslatable) share that eludes the empire of the 
possible. If we already think of the passage as a way of getting 
across, of overcoming two differences, as with a password for 
instance, we miss a tremendous opportunity: that of generating 
something else – more and less than a vessel. Opacity is the 
attitude that must guide us once we take Apichatpong as an 
intercessor. Wrapped in nocturnal noise, I cannot bring this 
surround, this dream that is Apichatpong’s cinema back to me 
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(“my hands”). I do not pretend to understand it, or explain it 
(to myself). I have a sympathy for it (a “giving-on-and-with”) 
that aims to prolong the wonder, the love and the fear of the 
mode of opacity that Apichatpong practices. The trajectory of 
this text – strewn with deviations – refuses to evaluate his work 
on the “scale of transparency” (Glissant 2011: 14) desired and 
instituted by Western philosophies. Yet, I see Apichatpong’s 
cinema as one that creates an interesting friction with the ideas 
and propositions that have travelled with me; one that troubles 
and, at the same time, parallels the signifiers that have hitherto 
dominated the context of my thinking process. Though I do not 
want to place his films before the horizon of transparency drawn 
by European onto-epistemologies, I deeply desire their encounter 
in order to unleash something that may intimidate my perception 
of, and belief in the theories that have shaped the stage of the 
return. I see Apichatpong’s cinema as one that may allow us to 
imagine a greater outside to the forms and images that have 
currency in the spaces which have (more or less successfully) 
disciplined the intellectual life of many contemplators of time, 
including me. If it seems hospitable to the ideas prompted and 
promoted by a Eurocentric (predominantly white, male) cohort of 
thinkers, it nonetheless interrupts or halts their transcendental 
legitimacy by provoking these limits and cuts that exhort us/
them to think again. So we don’t go straight, we only begin to 
open on the totality of the world. Neither a confirmation (of) 
nor in conformation (with), his cinema, as experience, that is, 
as thought, puts into test the onto-epistemological resistance 
of what I think-“I”-know of being and becoming. In other words, 
the unsettling of perception cannot be done without taking the 
propositions or ideas that one lives with (and is haunted by) 
somewhere else – finding the alternatives with-in. As the writer 
and filmmaker Trinh T. Minh-ha so eloquently claims, the only 
attitude that is worth pursuing is one that allows us to speak 
nearby, by adventure and creativity. 
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***
Apichatpong is a time-maker in the sense of appreciating and 
dramatizing its untimeliness. Time (of history, of survivance, of 
becoming, of the night-jungle) and images knot themselves in 
an experiential fabric with the figure of the ghost, that which 
leaves and yet comes back, that which haunts without being any 
less real and capable of (inter)action. However they appear (as 
effects of the film-dream17), Weerasethakul’s ghost-travellers are 
unable to come to life (“now and again”) without having to pass 
away (from and towards). The gaze of the soldier that repeatedly 
provokes the camera during the opening credits of Tropical 
Malady ( film 1) calls the time of the image into question: perhaps 
it evokes his embarrassment, barely concealed, of addressing 
himself to us or seducing us as his ghost counterparts, after 
having erased or complicated all screenic distance. Perhaps 
we, as well, (will) have passed away! But: “From where, from 
what place and what time, does this ghost speak to us?” (Didi-
Huberman 2002: 32). If a “truly ‘historical’ rendition,” proposed by 
Nietzsche “would be ghostly speech before ghosts” (2007: 242) 
how then could we avoid thinking that it is through this quality 
– spectrality – that Boonmee addresses those who come to 
visit him (“What if I’m already dead?” he asks, anxious about his 
passing); that it is in the ghostly manner and contemporaneous 
presence of those who are no longer or not yet living that 
Apichatpong haunts – the image of – time?
Hence Didi-Huberman’s question: “Can we ever foresee that 
which, of the past, is called to survive and haunt us in the future?” 
(Didi-Huberman 2002: 512), a question that I modify as follows: 
How to think and feel that which from today haunts – already 
– the hypothetical tomorrow? And how will we recognize that 
which from our “vagrant now” will be “called” to err “again”? Only 
the force of change (with its fabulatory variants and infrathins) 
can trouble the categories of repetition and recognition, and 
offer an opportunity to marvel at the art of variation. And only 
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one sole eternity – not just of a Nietzschian type, for we also 
need to project ourselves into the activity and the technicity of 
the detour – can “see” that which could have defeated memory’s 
terrifying act of forgetting. But, to think about it for a moment, 
do we want to persist in the present of those who will inherit 
ours? Not only must modes of fugitivity be parasitic towards 
(protest against) that which petrifies us (and prevents us from 
dreaming), but also become the architects of an innocent love. 
This is what Boonmee’s wife, Huay, seems to suggest to her 
beloved one: “Ghosts aren’t attached to places, but to people. To 
the living.”
So: what if we’re already alive?
Notes
1. Didi-Huberman adds: “Inevitably there is a split that separates in us 
that which we see from that which sees us. One must start from this 
paradox where in unfolding, the act of seeing opens itself in two” 
(Didi-Huberman 1992: 9). For Didi-Huberman, it is essential to follow 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty towards an inevitable Visibility. For more 
on this subject, see the chapter “The Intertwining – The Chasm” in 
Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible (1968).
2. Nietzsche’s hypothesis of the eternal return is splendidly expressed 
by Zarathustra’s speech in “Of the Vision and the Riddle”: “From this 
gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity lies be-
hind us. Must not all things that can run have already run along this 
lane? Must not all things that can happen have already happened, 
been done, run past? …And are not all things bound fast together 
in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? 
Therefore – draws itself too?” (Nietzsche 1969: 179).
3. An air of the quasi-quotidian, the quasi-documentary, floats around 
their peaceful romance, to the point where the recording of the 
images and sounds intrude on their intimacy. And the image of the 
soldier, accompanying the credits, who returns our look, seems to 
be embarrassed by the presence of the camera. It’s here that one 
of the main themes that is noticed by critics appears: the strange 
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naturalism and familiarity of the images. Thus, for Claire Valade, the 
way that Weerasethakul mixes the fantastic and the quotidian “as if 
it was totally natural” serves to discredit his realism and not “attach 
himself”, when on the contrary, in the eyes of Natalie Boehler, the 
film “cultivates a sort of naturalism of the supernatural” that begs to 
be celebrated (302). See Claire Valade’s “Oncle Boonmee (celui qui se 
souvient de ses vies antérieures): la vie dans l’entre-monde” (2011) 
and Natalie Boehler’s “The Jungle as Border Zone: The Aesthetics of 
Nature in the Work of Apichatpong Weerasethakul” (2011). 
4. A note on the subject of the inexplicable is warranted, in that it fails 
to induce its proper erasure in the infra-empirical order. It does 
otherwise: nothing can account for this essential difference that 
crucially cuts within the plane of the image-body. The (sensuously) 
explicable cannot be thought as its negative, or its impossibility, as 
that which it most fiercely opposes. Furthermore, it’s the inexpli-
cable that produces the shock of images, and not the inverse. “It is 
not surprising that, strictly speaking, difference should be ‘inexpli-
cable’. Difference is explicated, but in systems in which it tends to 
be cancelled; this means only that difference is essentially impli-
cated, that its being is implication. For difference, to be explicated 
is to be cancelled or to dispel the inequality which constitutes it” 
(Deleuze 1994: 228).
5. Noi Inthanon is the pen name of Malai Chupinit, author of Long 
Phrai: Suea Kueng Puthakan (1955) from which the Thai title of the 
film, Satpralat, is taken: literally “monster”. 
6. One must not be deceived by the numbering that sequences the 
film’s passing. One and two, but we can also count one and one 
and… in order to underline the eternal beginning of what we experi-
ence in perception. 
7. Desire being the leitmotif of Anti-Oedipus.
8. Guattari specifies that one of the aims of this detour is a “dis-
positional mise-en-scène, a bringing-into-existence, that authorizes, 
‘secondarily’, a discursive intelligibility” (Guattari: 2008: 26). This 
“bringing into existence” is what we call trans-apparition, the meta-
morphosis of subjects or things that participate in a situation (move-
ment) that is far from equilibrium.
9. We believe that it is this twisting of habit that defines 
Weerasethakul’s way of fighting for a broadening of feeling, and that 
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the passion of his images are complicit in a defamiliarization with 
those that preceded them. 
10. “In Time the same object is not the same after a 1 second interval” 
(Duchamp 1983: note 7). 
11. It is our perceptions that do not last long enough to glimpse even 
one process of individuation whose movement through form takes 
all of the time afforded to it. The speed of perception is a mat-
ter that the philosophy of the future must endow with new books 
and theories.
12. Here, Gilles Deleuze builds on a passage from Tome I of Marcel 
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.
13. Life is enjoyment: which means that it is nothing other than activity, 
and not simply passion. Whitehead writes according to this form of 
transcendental empiricism, which undoubtedly brings him close to a 
thinker like William James. “Each moment of experience,” he writes, 
in a style that sympathizes with the ideas of James, “confesses to be 
a transition between two worlds, the immediate past and the im-
mediate future” (Whitehead 1967: 192). 
14. This refrain appears multiple times in Flight from Nevèrÿon, 
Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1994. Delany is a writer that 
doesn’t know where and when to begin. Another groundbreaking 
work of afro-speculative fiction is Kindred by Octavia E. Butler: the 
story takes us to the core of this complexity, beyond the strictures 
(historical, scientific) and formulations (necessities, determina-
tions) of time.
15. Here I put forth my own interpretation of this Whiteheadian syn-
tagm. We can read in The Concept of Nature that such a dismem-
bering of reality “bifurcates nature into two divisions, namely into 
the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the 
cause of awareness. The nature which is the fact apprehended in 
awareness holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of 
the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the 
feel of the velvet. The nature which is the cause of awareness is the 
conjectured system of molecules and electrons which so affects the 
mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature” (Whitehead 
1964: 30–1). It seems to me that Weerasethakul, just like Whitehead, 
disobeys the subjectivist principle of separation between appear-
ance and reality, and looks to delve into an immediacy of con-
sciousness, an immanence where human perception can no longer 
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distance itself from anything. The opacity of the Weerasethakulian 
gesture is reluctant to put the perspective of the so-called feline 
at odds with that of the so-called human. The fact is that the tiger 
not only knows how to think for himself, but also, and maybe most 
of all, makes think his felt surrounding. The essential aspect of the 
Weerasethakul-operation is not to bifurcate reality, but on the con-
trary, affirm the plurality of dialects and rationalities. 
16. The night-time – a chance, that is to say a trigger that allows cinema 
to attempt to amplify the real – is directly put together through 
Apichatpong’s (physical, photochemical) seizures: a necessity that 
goes to the length of appearing on the catalogue cover of one of his 
installation entitled For Tomorrow, For Tonight. 
17. Apichatpong suggests that cinema, just like spectres and even 
dreams, is metamorphic in essence: “Film is like an entity by itself. 
The phantom is not disappearing but something that transforms 
itself. Cinema also has been transforming itself. Thus cinema can 
be a phantom in this sense: because it’s something that you really 
need to dream. Cinema is a vehicle we produce for ourselves and 
as part of us. It’s like an extension of our soul that manifests itself” 
(Kim 2011: 52).
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